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Resumen
Los sistemas de gran escala son sistemas conformados por diferentes elementos interactuando
entre s´ı. Cada uno de estos elementos tiene asignado un controlador local encargado de de-
cidir las acciones de control locales que deben ser aplicadas con el fin de alcanzar un objetivo.
Por lo general, estas acciones son tomadas sin tener en cuenta su efecto en el comportamiento
de los dema´s elementos ni en el desempen˜o global del sistema. Este comportamiento puede
llevar al sistema a puntos de operacio´n indeseables. Con el a´nimo de resolver este prob-
lema, el control de sistemas de gran escala se ha venido formulando como un problema de
optimizacio´n con restricciones, siendo el control predictivo basado en modelos la estrategia
de control ma´s promisoria para el control de este tipo de sistemas.
Sin embargo, debido a que el control predictivo basado en modelos es una estrategia de
control basada en optimizacio´n, no es posible su aplicacio´n directa a sistemas de gran escala,
ya que t´ıpicamente el control predictivo se implementa de forma centralizada y esto requiere
la transmisio´n de grandes volu´menes de informacio´n y el uso de un alto poder computacional.
Por tales motivos, los me´todos de control distribuido basados en controladores predictivos
surgen como una alternativa para su implementacio´n en sistemas de gran escala.
A pesar de los esfuerzos dedicados al disen˜o de estrategias de control distribuido basadas
en control predictivo, la cooperacio´n entre subsistemas sigue siendo un problema de invest-
igacio´n abierto. Con el fin de superar este problema, la teor´ıa de juegos surge como un marco
teo´rico alternativo para formular y caracterizar el problema de control predictivo distribuido.
La teor´ıa de juegos es una rama de las matema´ticas aplicadas dedicada a identificar patrones
de comportamiento en situaciones estrate´gicas, donde el beneficio percibido por cada uno de
los individuos involucrados esta´ determinado tanto por sus decisiones como por las decisiones
que toman los dema´s individuos.
En esta tesis, se propone una estrategia de control predictivo distribuida basada en juegos de
negociacio´n. Sin entrar en detalles, un juego de negociacio´n es una situacio´n en la que varios
individuos deciden, conjuntamente, que´ estrategia es la mejor para alcanzar un beneficio
mutuo. El uso de este tipo de juegos como marco de referencia permite tratar el problema
de cooperacio´n entre subsistemas usando control predictivo distribuido. Adicionalmente, este
marco de referencia permite formular soluciones para el problema de control distribuido en las
que los subsistemas no tienen que resolver ma´s de un problema de optimizacio´n, facilitando
la reduccio´n de la carga computacional asociada a cada problema de optimizacio´n local. En
el caso particular de esta tesis, tal solucio´n fue´ propuesta a partir de una caracterizacio´n
axioma´tica. Para esta solucio´n, las condiciones para la estabilidad en lazo cerrado tambie´n
se discuten.
Palabras clave: Control predictivo, teor´ıa de juegos, sistemas de gran escala.
xAbstract
Large-scale systems are systems composed of several interacting components. Each com-
ponent has a local controller with a local control objective, designed to take local decisions
without considering the effect of their local control actions into the whole system perform-
ance. This issue may drive the system to undesirable closed-loop performance due to the
“competition” among controllers. In order to overcome this issue, the control of large-scale
systems has been formulated as a constrained optimization problem. In this way, model pre-
dictive control schemes have been arising as a promising alternative for controlling large-scale
systems.
Since model predictive control is an optimization based control scheme its centralized applic-
ation in large-scale systems may become impractical because it may require the exchange
of large amounts of information and the usage of high computational power. Therefore,
distributed model predictive control schemes arise as an alternative for the implementation
of model predictive control schemes in large-scale systems.
Despite of the efforts dedicated to design methods for distributed model predictive control,
the cooperation among subsystems still remains as an open research problem. In order to
overcome this issue, game theory arises as an alternative to formulate and characterize the
distributed model predictive problem. Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics used
to capture behaviors in strategic situations where the outcome of a player is function not
only of his choices but also depends on the choices of others.
In this thesis, a bargaining game based distributed model predictive control scheme is pro-
posed. Roughly speaking, a bargaining game is a situation where several players jointly
decide which strategy is best with respect to their mutual benefit. This allows to deal with
the cooperation issues of the distributed model predictive control problem. Additionally, the
bargaining game framework allows to formulate solutions for the distributed model predict-
ive control problem where the subsystems do not have to solve more than one optimization
problem at each time step. This, also allows to reduce the computational burden of the
local optimization problems. In the particular case of this thesis, such solution is proposed
based on an axiomatic characterization. For the proposed solution, the conditions for the
closed-loop stability are also discussed.
Keywords: Model predictive control, game theory, large-scale systems.
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1. Introduction
This chapter presents the background and the motivation for the research addressed in this
thesis. In Section 1.1 a description of the type of systems considered in this thesis and
their typical operation is done: large-scale systems. In Section 1.2 a discussion of the use of
model predictive control in large-scale systems and a motivation on the use of distributed
model predictive control schemes with this purpose is presented. In Section 1.3 conceptual
ideas of distributed model predictive control are presented as strategy to control large-scale
systems. Moreover, several approaches reported in the literature are discussed and their
advantages and drawbacks are highlighted. Also, it is motivated the use of game theory as
an alternative to formulate and analyze distributed model predictive control schemes. In
Section 1.4 a rough definition of game theory, its objective, and its framework are presented.
Additionally, several insights about the application of game theory to formulate distributed
model predictive control schemes are addressed. For each insight advantages and drawbacks
are highlighted. Section 1.5 briefly describes the distributed model predictive control scheme
proposed in this thesis. Section 1.6 gathers the thesis outline, the road map, and the main
contributions.
1.1. Large-Scale Systems
Large-scale systems are systems composed of several interacting components. Each compon-
ent has a local controller with a local control objective. These objectives can or cannot be
coupled with the remaining control objectives. Often, these are classic proportional-integral
(PI) or proportional-integral-derivative (PID) designed for taking local decisions without
considering the effect of their local control actions into the whole system performance and
vice versa (see (Faille, 2009) for an example). This issue may drive the system to undesirable
closed-loop performance due to the “competition” among controllers. Recall that in large-
scale systems (and in general on interacting systems) the local control inputs may affect the
performance of the remaining controllers.
In order to overcome the issues related with the use of local classic controllers, the control
of large-scale systems has been formulated as a constrained optimization problem. With
this formulation it is possible to design multivariable controllers that include the interaction
among elements composing the whole system. The methods used are (see (Xiaohong et al.,
1999) and the references therein):
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• Dynamic programming
• Network flow algorithms
• Standard mixed integer programming
• Network flow plus dynamic programming with some heuristics
In this way, model predictive control schemes have been arising as a promising alternative
for controlling large-scale systems.
1.2. Model Predictive Control
Model predictive control (MPC) is an optimal control technique whose objective is to regulate
the states and/or the outputs of the system towards their desired values, by minimizing a cost
function inside a feasible region (Li et al., 2005). This allows MPC to handle complex systems
with input and state constraints, making such control scheme one of the most successful
advanced control techniques implemented in industry only second to PID (Proportional-
Integral-Derivative) control (Camponogara et al., 2002; Di Palma and Magni, 2004; Dunbar
and Desa, 2007; Necoara et al., 2008; Negenborn, 2007). Typically (from the implementation
point of view) MPC schemes have the following features (Li et al., 2005):
• The minimization is implemented in a centralized way.
• A single global model is used to predict the system behavior.
• The control actions are computed as a solution of a single optimization problem.
Therefore, MPC schemes rely on the model accuracy and often also on the availability
of sufficiently fast computational resources (Venkat et al., 2008). These facts make the
centralized MPC impractical, inflexible, and unsuitable, for large-scale systems because it
requires exchange of large amounts of information and usage of high computational power
(Camponogara et al., 2002; Camponogara and Talukdar, 2007; Doan et al., 2008; Du et al.,
2001; Li et al., 2005; Negenborn, 2007; Necoara et al., 2008; Venkat et al., 2007, 2008; Wang
and Cameron, 2007).
With the purpose of dealing with the drawbacks of the implementations of MPC schemes
in large scale systems, distributed model predictive control (DMPC) schemes arose as an
alternative due to (Li et al., 2005; Negenborn, 2007):
• Their capability to divide a complex problem into several subproblems.
• Their ability to reduce the computational load and the information exchange required
for the implementation of MPC in real large-scale applications.
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1.3. Distributed Model Predictive Control
DMPC is a control scheme in which the system is divided into a number of subsystems.
Each subsystem is able to share information with other subsystems in order to determine
its local control action (Negenborn, 2007; Negenborn et al., 2008; Talukdar et al., 2005;
Wang and Cameron, 2007). The main goal of the DMPC approach is to achieve some
degree of coordination among subsystems that are solving local MPC problems with locally
relevant variables, costs, and constraints, without solving the centralized MPC problem
(Camponogara et al., 2002; Jia and Krogh, 2001; Necoara et al., 2008). Compared with
totally decentralized MPC schemes (noncentralized MPC controllers without information
exchange) the global performance of the system is improved (Camponogara et al., 2002;
Negenborn, 2007; Negenborn et al., 2008), but the computational cost is increased due to
communication, cooperation and maybe negotiation among subsystems (Negenborn, 2007).
Several approaches to the DMPC problem have been presented in the literature:
1. In (Camponogara et al., 2002; Dunbar and Murray, 2006; Jia and Krogh, 2001) a
DMPC framework was proposed for independent subsystems linked only by the cost
function. In this framework important features are:
• Only information about the local control actions was exchanged.
• Providing some information about the predicted states trajectories or sets of pos-
sible reachable states can help to avoid communication problems.
• Constraints were added in order to guarantee the stability of the closed-loop
system.
2. In (Doan et al., 2008; Necoara et al., 2008) an iterative Jacobi algorithm was used to
solve DMPC problems involving sparse dynamical systems with linear coupled dynam-
ics and convex coupled constrains. In this approach important features are:
• Only information about the states was exchanged.
• The computational complexity of a DMPC problem was reduced.
• The adaptability to different kind of systems was considered.
• The convergence to the centralized optimum and the conditions for the closed-loop
stability were stated.
• An improvement can be achieved by the proximal center decomposition method.
3. In (Jia and Krogh, 2002; Rantzer, 2006, 2008, 2009) dual-based decomposition methods
for solving DMPC problems were proposed. In these methods important features are:
• The minimization problem was transformed into a minimax problem assuming
the effects of the other subsystems as disturbances in the local MPC.
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• The communication among subsystems was reduced.
• The computational burden associated with the solution of the local MPC problem
was increased.
4. In (Venkat et al., 2008, 2006a,b) a feasible-cooperation DMPC scheme was proposed.
In this approach important features are:
• A systemwide cost function is used.
• The local MPC was solved considering the effect of the local control actions in
the performance of the remaining subsystems.
Despite of the efforts dedicated to the formulation of the DMPC schemes presented before,
the following issues arise:
• The paradigm to formulate the DMPC approaches considers the neighbors as a dis-
turbance sources.
• Often, it is required an iterative procedure to compute the control actions to be applied
to the controlled system.
• The whole system must be stable and controllable.
• Often, the subsystems are forced to cooperate without taking into account whether
the cooperative behavior gives some benefit to the subsystems, and might steer the
subsystems to operating points where they do not perceive any benefit.
Considering all these issues, game theory arises as an alternative to formulate and char-
acterize the DMPC problem of not being able to determine when the subsystems should
cooperate or not. It is worth to notice that (in the DMPC framework) the fact that the
subsystems are forced to cooperate can be viewed as an advantage. However, as it will be
shown in Chapters 2, and 4 the DMPC problem can be analyzed as an strategic situation
(or game). In this framework each subsystem has a compromise between local and global
performance. Such compromise is associated with the coupling among the local optimization
problems resulting from the system decomposition made in order to formulate the DMPC
problem (see Chapter 2 for details). Hence, if the local performance of each subsystem is
not good enough, then the performance of the remaining subsystems is not good enough.
Therefore, the entire system performance is decreased.
Additionally, based on the game theory framework the following elements arise to deal with
the common issues of the conventional DMPC schemes(see Chapters 4 and 5 for details):
• In game theory the competition among subsystems can be addressed by establishing
the relationship between the local and global objectives.
6 1 Introduction
• The use of utility functions allows to derive negotiation models to solve the DMPC
problem without involving iterative procedures based on the transformation of the
original cooperative game into a non-cooperative game with several moves.
• The strategic framework associated with game theory provides decision elements where
the resulting negotiation models allow to the subsystems decide to cooperate or not
depending on the benefit perceived by the cooperative behavior.
1.4. Game-Theory-Based Approaches to Distributed Model
Predictive Control
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics used in social sciences, economics, biology
(particularly evolutionary biology and ecology), engineering, political science, international
relations, computer science, and philosophy (see (Von Neumann et al., 1947) for a more
detailed definition of game theory). Game theory attempts to capture behaviors in strategic
situations, or games where the outcome of a player is function not only of his choices but also
depends on the choices of others (Myerson, 1991). While initially developed to analyze com-
petitions in which one individual does better at the expense of others, it has been expanded
to treat a wide class of behaviours, which are classified according to several criteria. Today,
“game theory is a sort of ‘unified field’ theory for the rational side of social science, where
‘social’ is interpreted broadly to include human as well as non-human players (computers,
animals, plants)”(Aumann, 1987).
Some approaches to DMPC based on game theory concepts have been proposed, e.g.:
1. In (Du et al., 2001; Li et al., 2005; Giovanini and Balderud, 2006; Trodden et al., 2009)
DMPC schemes based on Nash-optimality were proposed. In such approaches:
• DMPC problem was formulated as a non-cooperative game.
• The solution of the DMPC schemes converged to the Nash equilibrium point of
the game.
• Properties like convergence and feasibility were derived based on the concept of
Nash equilibrium point.
• Each subsystem makes suggestions about the control actions of the remaining
subsystems.
2. In (Rantzer, 2006, 2008, 2009) the DMPC problem was related with the game theory
using the cooperative game framework proposed by Von Neumann et al. (1947). In
these approaches:
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• The Lagrange multipliers used in the dual decomposition methods were conceived
as price mechanisms in a market serving to achieve mutual agreements among
subsystems.
• Dynamic price mechanisms were used for decomposing and distributing the op-
timization associated with the original MPC problem.
• The solution of the DMPC schemes converged to the Nash equilibrium point of
the game.
• The minimization problem is converted in a minimax problem.
3. In (Mun˜oz et al., 2009; J. M. Maestre et al., 2011; J.M. Maestre et al., 2011; C. Portilla
et al., 2012b) some other approaches of the DMPC problem based on cooperative game
theory were presented. In these approaches:
• Each subsystem makes suggestions about the local control actions of the remaining
subsystems.
• The local control actions are computed by each subsystem based on the local
information and on the suggestions about the local control actions made by the
remaining subsystems.
• Each subsystem has to compute more than one optimization problem (at each
time step) to compute the local control actions.
According to Nash (1950b) an equilibrium point of an n-person game is a set of decisions such
that each player (subsystem in the DMPC case) maximizes his payoff (minimizes its local
cost function for DMPC applications) if the decisions of the others are held fixed. Although
from the strategic point of view the objective is to achieve the Nash equilibrium point, from
the control theory point of view such equilibrium point may be undesirable because it may
produce an undesirable closed-loop behavior of the controlled system (see (Venkat et al.,
2008, 2006a,b) for details).
1.5. Bargaining-Game-Based Approach to Distributed
Model Predictive Control
Summarizing, from the literature review presented in Sections 1.3 and 1.4 it is possible to
conclude that:
1. The control-theory-based DMPC schemes:
• Require iterative procedures to compute the control actions to be applied to the
system.
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• Require the system and the subsystems to be stable and controllable.
• Force the subsystems to cooperate independent of the local benefit perceived by
the cooperative behavior.
2. The game-theory-based DMPC schemes:
• Deal with the issues regarding the cooperation and the dependence of the DMPC
methods of the system decomposition.
• Almost all of them are based on the Nash optimality concept (with their disad-
vantages).
• Require that each subsystem solves more than one optimization problem at each
time step in order to compute the control actions to be applied to the system.
In order to tackle the drawbacks of the reviewed DMPC schemes and taking game theory as a
mathematical framework, in this work a bargaining-game-based DMPC scheme is proposed.
Roughly speaking, a bargaining game is a situation where several players (subsystems in
the control framework) jointly decide decide which strategy is best with respect to their
mutual benefit (Nash, 1950b,a, 1953). This mathematical framework was selected because
following the axiomatic characterization proposed by Nash (1953); Peters (1992) it is possible
to solve the bargaining game as a non-cooperative game by using utility functions. Hence,
it is avoided the use of iterative procedures to compute (in a distributed way) the optimal
control actions to be applied to the system. Thus, the proposed control scheme has the
following features
• An iterative procedure is not required to compute the control actions to be applied to
the controlled system.
• The subsystems are not forced to cooperate, i.e., each subsystem is able to decide
whether to cooperate or not with other subsystems depending on the benefit received
from the cooperative behavior.
• The paradigm to determine the interaction among subsystem is: Focussing on others.
• Each subsystem does not have to compute more than one optimization problem at
each time step.
• The solution of the game is Pareto optimal (there is no convergence to Nash equi-
librium point because the bargaining games are cooperative and the concept of Nash
equilibrium point only applies to non-cooperative games).
Aiming this goal:
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1. It is assumed that subsystems “bargain” among each other in order to (jointly) decide
which strategy is best with respect to their mutual benefit.
2. The definition of bargaining games was extended in order to involve situations where
the players jointly decide which strategy to use according their mutual benefit consid-
ering infinite decision rounds in a time-variant decision environment.
3. The DMPC problem is analyzed as an n-person bargaining game based on the concepts
presented in (Nash, 1950b,a, 1953) about such games.
4. An axiomatic characterization for the solution of the resulting DMPC game is proposed
following the axiomatic characterization proposed by Nash (1950b,a, 1953).
5. A distributed solution (based on the axiomatic characterization) of the bargaining
DMPC game is proposed.
The selection of the bargaining approach was made because its main insight is focusing
on others, i.e., “to assess your added value, you have to ask not what other players can
bring to you but what you can bring to other players”(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995).
In addition, since bargaining games belong are an special case of cooperative games their
outcome does not converge to a Nash equilibrium point. Thus, the drawbacks associated
with such convergence are avoided. But, due to the outcome of the bargaining games are
Pareto optimal, some suboptimality can be expected compared with conventional DMPC
schemes.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the relationship between the reviewed DMPC schemes and the proposed
control scheme.
1.6. Overview of this Thesis
1.6.1. Thesis Outline
The remaining of this thesis is organized as follows:
• In Chapter 2, the DMPC problem is introduced. With this purpose:
1. The concept of DMPC is illustrated, and then formalized by presenting its math-
ematical formulation.
2. From the mathematical formulation of DMPC it is concluded that the resulting
optimization problem becomes a set of coupled optimization problems where the
decisions of each subsystem affect the behavior and decisions of the remaining
subsystems.
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Advantages:
1. Optimal system behavior
2. Appropriated for complex systems
3. State and input constraints 
included in the computation of the 
control inputs
Disadvantages:
1. Centralized computation
2. Impractical, inflexible, unsuitable 
for large-scale systems due to the 
information and computation issues
MODEL PREDICTIVE CONTROL
DISTRIBUTED MODEL 
PREDICTIVE CONTROL
Advantages:
1. Reduced computational 
burden.
2. Reduced complexity
Disadvantages:
1. Remaining subsystems as 
sources of disturbances.
2. Iterative procedures to 
compute the control actions
3. The whole syste must be 
stable and controllable
4. Subsystems forced to 
cooperate 
GAME THEORY BASED 
DISTRIBUTED MODEL 
PREDICTIVE CONTROL
Advantages:
1. The issues regarding the 
cooperation are addressed
2. The methods are 
independent of the system 
decomposition 
Disadvantages:
1. Each subsytem has to 
solve more than one 
optimization problem.
2. Almost all methods 
converge to a Nash 
equilibrium point
PROPOSED CONTROL SCHEME
From the game theory framework seeks to:
1. Each subsystem is able to decide whether to cooperate or not.
2. The paradigm is focussing on others.
3. That the subsystems do not have to solve more than one optimization problem. 
4. That the solution does not converge to a Nash equilibrium point (since the resulting 
game is a cooperative game, then the solution is Pareto optimal).
Considering a dynamic decision environment (recall that bargaining game theory 
asummes an static decision environment) 
Figure 1-1.: Relationship between the reviewed approaches and the proposed DMPC scheme.
In this Figure, bold squares remark the elements considered to formulate the
DMPC scheme proposed in this work.
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3. Finally, based on the conclusion stated in item 2, the relation between DMPC
and game theory is established.
• In Chapter 3, a mathematical background of bargaining game theory is presented.
Taking such objective in mind:
1. The concept of game, and its classification in cooperative and non-cooperative
games are introduced.
2. Based on such classification, the concept of bargaining game is presented as a
particular case of cooperative games.
3. Then, the concept of bargaining games and their properties are mathematically
formalized, and the axiomatic theory proposed by Nash (1950b,a, 1953) is intro-
duced.
• In Chapter 4, the formulation of the DMPC problem as a particular case of discrete-
time dynamic bargaining games is presented. Aiming this goal:
1. The similarities and differences between the bargaining game framework and the
distributed model predictive control theory framework are discussed. Then, the
concept of discrete-time dynamic bargaining game is introduced.
2. Later, an axiomatic characterization of the solution of a discrete-time bargaining
game is presented. Such characterization is based on the one proposed by Nash
(1950b,a, 1953) for bargaining games.
3. Finally, the DMPC problem is analyzed as a particular case of such games, and
a distributed solution for the resulting DMPC game is proposed.
As a consequence of the formulation of the DMPC as a discrete-time dynamic bargain-
ing game, the distributed solution of the DMPC game does not require an iterative
procedure to compute the control actions to be applied to the controlled system. This
solution, also allows each subsystem to quantify the effect of its decisions in the per-
formance of the remaining subsystems (the paradigm focussing on others), and to
decide whether to cooperate or not depending on the perceived benefit from the co-
operative behavior. For the proposed procedure, the conditions for the closed-loop
stability are also discussed.
• In Chapter 5 the theoretical issues presented in Chapter 4 are illustrated. With this
purpose:
1. The quadruple tank system is used to illustrate situations where the DMPC can
be formulated as a symmetric bargaining game.
2. A chain of two reactors followed by a flash separator is used to illustrate situations
where the DMPC can be analyzed as a non-symmetric bargaining game.
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• In Chapter 6 a hydro-power valley is presented as a case study. In this Chapter:
– The concept and the elements conforming a hydro-power valley are presented.
Also, the case study is described.
– The mathematical model of the hydro-power valley considered as a case of study
is formulated.
– Based on this mathematical model both scenarios are considered as testbeds:
a power reference scenario and an economic scenario. For both scenarios, the
formulation of the DMPC problem as a discrete-time bargaining game and the
simulation results are presented.
• Finally, Chapter 7 gathers the concluding remarks and future works.
1.6.2. Thesis Road Map
Figure 1.6.2 illustrates the relationship among the chapters of the thesis and the ordering
in which they can be read. Chapter 2 contains the conceptual and the mathematical form-
alization of the problem addressed in the thesis: distributed model predictive control; and
is therefore suggested to be read first. Chapters 3 and 4 focus both on issues related with
game theory and bargaining games. Particularly, Chapter 4 deals with the formulation of
distributed model predictive control as a bargaining game, and then it contains the main
contributions of this thesis. Although Chapters 3 and 4 are related each other, it is possible
to understand the contributions of this thesis without reading Chapter 3. However, it is
recommended to read Chapter 3 before Chapter 4. Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate the concepts
introduced in Chapter 4. Chapter 7 summarizes the results of this thesis and give direc-
tions for future research. Finally, Appendixes A and B focus both on mathematical details
of Chapters 2 and 4 respectively. Therefore, it is suggested to read these appendixes to
support the reading of the related chapters.
1.6.3. Main Contributions
From the development of this thesis the following contributions have been done:
1. A new DMPC based on the axiomatic game theory proposed by Nash (1950b,a, 1953).
The solution of the proposed control scheme was characterized from two perspectives:
the point of view of the game theory and the point of view of the control theory. Such
control scheme has the following characteristics:
• The paradigm is focussing on others, i.e., each subsystem is able to determine
how its decisions affect the behavior of the remaining subsystem and based on
this effect decide which control action must be locally applied.
1.6 Overview of this Thesis 13
Figure 1-2.: Road map of the thesis. Arrows indicate read before relations.
• The subsystems are able to decide whether cooperate or not based on the perceived
benefit from the cooperative behavior.
• The subsystems do not have to solve more than one optimization problem at each
time step (one of the main drawbacks of the game theory based DMPC schemes
reported in the literature), and there are not iterative procedures to compute
the control actions to be applied to the controlled system (as it will be shown
in Chapter 4 the solution of the resulting optimization problem is unique and
Pareto optimal, then there are no disadvantages associated with the avoidance of
iterative procedures).
• Since the resulting DMPC game belongs to the cooperative games the proposed
solution for such game does not converge to a Nash equilibrium point.
2. A proposal of a more general class of bargaining games called discrete-time dynamic
bargaining games. This extension seeks to include bargaining situations with the fol-
lowing features:
• The decision space and the disagreement point may or may not evolve dynamically
according to certain rule (in control theory the evolution of the decision space is
determined by the constraints over the inputs and the states of the controlled
system).
14 1 Introduction
• The decision environment evolves according to a dynamic rule (in control theory
the state equation of the controlled system).
3. From the literature review about bargaining games, it is possible to conclude that
almost all procedures proposed to solve bargaining games imply a centralized com-
putation of the solution of the game. Such kind of computation is required because
(often) the solution of bargaining games is based on a coalition formation. This implies
that each player should make a proposal to the remaining players about the course of
action to be taken. Since (in this work) the bargaining framework is used to solve
the DMPC problem such solutions are not appropriate. Hence, an algorithm to solve
discrete-time dynamic bargaining games (in a distributed way) is proposed. This al-
gorithm is an extension to n-persons games of the algorithm proposed by Nash for
two-persons games. In this algorithm the original bargaining game is transformed into
a non-cooperative game with several moves, where each move is carried out by each
player in a separated way. This allows to derive a distributed procedure to solve n-
persons bargaining games without losing the properties established by Nash to solve
two-persons games (including the optimality).
4. A proposal of a dynamic rule for updating the disagreement point of the players (sub-
systems in control theory). Such rule is based on the following precept (Nash, 1953):
The disagreement should give to the players a strong incentive to increase their demands
as much as possible without losing compatibility. Therefore:
• If a subsystem decide to cooperate with the remaining subsystems, then its dis-
agreement point is decreased respect to the previous value in order to increase
the subsystem expectations from the cooperative behavior.
• If a subsystem decide not to cooperate with the remaining subsystems, then its
disagreement point is increased in order to motivate the cooperation of such sub-
system.
2. Distributed Model Predictive Control
2.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the distributed model predictive control formulation. In this control
scheme, the whole system is divided into several subsystems, where each subsystem is locally
controlled by an MPC whose cost function defines a local performance index derived from
a global cost function. In Section 2.2, the concept of distributed model predictive control is
discussed and some approaches are presented. In Section 2.3, the mathematical formulation
of distributed model predictive control is presented. In Section 2.4, some reviewed approaches
to distributed model predictive control are related with the mathematical formulation given
in Section 2.3. Finally, in Section 2.5 a summary of the chapter is done.
2.2. The Concept
Distributed model predictive control is a kind of decentralized control where some informa-
tion is exchanged among subsystems in order to determine each local control action (Negen-
born, 2007; Negenborn et al., 2008; Talukdar et al., 2005; Wang and Cameron, 2007). Com-
pared with totally decentralized control schemes, DMPC architectures have better closed-
loop behavior due to the communications, cooperation, and perhaps negotiation among
subsystems. However, these facts increase the computational and communication burden of
DMPC (Camponogara et al., 2002; Negenborn, 2007; Negenborn et al., 2008). Nevertheless,
DMPC becomes important because (Pimentel and Salazar, 2002; Yang et al., 2003):
• DMPC is effective to support the implementation of complex control systems with
hard requirements involving fault tolerance and flexibility
• DMPC has high monitoring and control capabilities.
• DMPC allows:
1. To implement optimal controllers in real large-scale systems.
2. To decompose the whole optimization problem into several ones, each with less
number of decision variables than the original problem.
3. To reduce considerably the computational burden associated with the implement-
ation of optimal controllers like MPC.
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Figure 2-1 shows a DMPC control scheme. In this Figure Process 1 and Process 2 have
local MPCs. Since these processes interact between them it is required that each local MPC
shares some information with the other local MPC in order to compute its own control
actions, otherwise the system may lose performance in each of the processes. Thus, at each
time step local controllers have three main tasks:
1. To compute the local control inputs
2. To transmit its decisions about the local control actions
3. To negotiate with the other controller which control action apply
For dealing with these three tasks, an iterative procedure is generally proposed. Often, a
tolerance threshold is defined for ending this procedure. Once this tolerance is achieved the
control inputs are applied to each process and the iterative procedure is started again.
Figure 2-1.: Schematic diagram of a typical distributed model predictive control scheme.
Here each process has a local MPC with the ability of sharing information with
the other MPC with the purpose of jointly decide which control actions apply.
In Section 2.3, the mathematical formulation associated with the DMPC problem is presen-
ted, and the concepts presented before are mathematically formalized.
2.3 Mathematical Formulation 17
2.3. Mathematical Formulation
Consider the nonlinear system given by
x˙(t) = fx(x(t), u(t))
y(t) = fy(x(t), u(t))
(2-1)
where x˙(t) = dx(t)
dt
, fx(·), fy(·) are smooth C1 functions, and x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm, and y ∈ Rz
denote the state, input, and output vectors of the dynamical system (2-1). Let x(k) and
u(k) denote the discrete values of x(t) and u(t) respectively at time step k. Furthermore,
assume that (at each time step k) the system (2-1) can be approximated by a discrete-time
linear time-invariant system
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k)
y(k) = Cx(k) +Du(k)
(2-2)
where A, B, C, D come from the linearization and disretization of (2-1). In the following,
we focus on the trajectories of the states x and their constraints. However, the method
described in this work can easily be extended to the cases where the output y is considered
in the cost function and in the constraints.
The idea of MPC is to determine the control inputs for the system (2-1) at each time step k,
by solving an optimal control problem over a prediction horizon Np, based on the prediction
of the behavior of (2-1) given by the model (2-2). Commonly, a quadratic cost function (2-3)
is used to measure the performance of the system (note that (2-3) can also be interpreted
as the total energy of the system).
L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) =
Np−1∑
t=0
[
xT (k + t|k)Qx(k + t|k)]+ Nu∑
t=0
[
uT (k + t)Ru(k + t)
]
+ xT (k +Np|k)Px(k +Np|k)
(2-3)
where the superscript T denotes the transpose operation, x(k + t|k) denotes the predicted
value of x at time step k+ t given the conditions at time step k, u(k+ t) denotes the control
input u at time step k + t, x˜(k) = [xT (k|k), . . . , xT (k + Np|k)]T , u˜(k) = [uT (k), . . . , uT (k +
Nu), . . . , u
T (k+Np)]
T , where x(k|k) = x(k), and u(k+t) = u(k+Nu), for t = Nu+1, . . . , Np−
1; Q, and R are diagonal matrices with positive diagonal elements, and Nu, Np being the
control and prediction horizon respectively, with Nu ≤ Np, and P being the solution of the
Lyapunov equation
ATPA− P = −Q
If (2-2) is stable (i.e., the norm of the eigenvalues of A is less than 1), and Q is positive
definite, it follows that P is also positive definite (Venkat et al., 2008).
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By repetitively substituting the equation (2-2) for x(k + t|k) into (2-3), and by using the
control horizon constraint u(k + t) = u(k + Nu), for t = Nu + 1, . . . , Np − 1, the function
L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) can be expressed as
L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) = φ(u˜(k); x(k))
where
φ(u˜(k); x(k)) = u˜T (k)Quuu˜(k) + x
T (k)Quxu˜(k) + x
T (k)Qxxx(k)
with Quu ∈ Rv×v, Qux ∈ Rn×v, Qxx ∈ Rn×n, Quu a definite positive matrix, i.e., Quu > 0,
and v = mNu. Thus, the MPC problem can be formulated as follows
min
u˜(k)
φ(u˜(k); x(k))
subject to: u˜(k) ∈ Ω
(2-4)
where Ω is the feasible set of control actions, determined by physical and operational limits
of the system (2-1).
If the order of the system (2-1) becomes large, the solution of the optimization problem (2-4)
becomes intractable in real time. Hence, a distributed solution of (2-4) is necessary, and a
decomposition of the model (2-2) is also needed.
Assume that the state update equation of (2-2) can be decomposed into M subsystems such
that the behavior of each subsystem can be expressed as
xi(k + 1) =
M∑
j=1
[Aijxj(k) +Bijuj(k)] yi(k) = Ciixi(k) +Diiui(k) (2-5)
where xi ∈ Rni, and ui ∈ Rmi denote the state and input vectors of the subsystem
i, i = 1, . . . ,M ; and Aij, Bij are submatrices of the entire linear model of the system,
i.e., submatrices of A, B. This model is also used in (Camponogara et al., 2002; Doan et al.,
2008; Du et al., 2001; Necoara et al., 2008; Venkat et al., 2008). From the system decom-
position (2-5), the cost function L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) can be expressed as (Venkat et al., 2006a,
2008)
L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) =
M∑
i=1
(
Np−1∑
t=0
xTi (k + t|k)Qixi(k + t|k) +
Nu∑
t=0
uTi (k + t)Riui(k + t)
+ xTi (k +Np|k)Pix(k +Np|k)
) (2-6)
with Pi, Qi, Ri ≥ 0, and Pi the solution of the local Lyapunov equation
ATiiPiAii − Pi = −Qi
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Note that (2-6) differs from (2-3) in the terminal cost, i.e., in general
∑M
k=1 x
T
i (k+Np|k)Pix(k+
Np|k) 6= xT (k+Np|k)Px(k+Np|k) (the equivalence is only achieved if P is a block diagonal-
matrix). In the remaining of this thesis, the definition of L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) given in (2-6) will be
considered as the global cost function. Substituting (2-5) for xi(k + t) into (2-6) yields
L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) =
M∑
i=1
φi(u˜(k); x(k)) (2-7)
where
φi(u˜(k); x(k)) = u˜
T (k)Quuiu˜(k) + 2x
T (k)Qxuiu˜(k) + x
TQxxix(k) (2-8)
with Quui ≥ 0, for i = 1, . . . ,M (a detailed demonstration of how to obtain (2-8) can be
found in Appendix A). In (2-8) the notation φi(u˜(k); x(k)) indicates that the argument of φi
is u˜(k) and x(k) is a parameter of φi. Clearly, φi is a positive-definite quadratic function of
u˜(k) and thus it is convex in u˜(k) (For the sake of simplicity of notation we will not indicate
the dependence of φi on x(k) explicitly in the remainder of this text and thus write φi(u(k))
instead φi(u(k); x(k))).
Let Ωi = Π
Nu
j=0Λi be the set of feasible control actions for u˜i(k), where u˜i(k) = [u
T
i (k), . . . , u
T
i (k+
Nu)]
T , and Λi is the feasible set for the control action ui(k + j), for j = 0, . . . , Nu determ-
ined by the physical and operational limits of subsystem i. Assume that 0 ∈ Λi, and that
Λi is closed, convex and independent of k for i = 1, . . . ,M (closedness of Λi is required for
mathematical convenience). Note that Ω = ΠMi=1Ωi is the feasible set for the whole system
determined by the physical and operational constraints.
The sets Ωi, Ω have been similarly defined in (Doan et al., 2008; Dunbar and Desa, 2007;
Necoara et al., 2008; Venkat et al., 2006b, 2008, 2006a). Also note, that there are constraints
only at the inputs. This was made under the assumption that the state constraints were time
independent and could be expressed as input constraints using the prediction model. Systems
like the quadruple tank system presented in (I. Alvarado et al., 2010), the two reactors chain
followed by a flash separator presented in (F. Valencia et al., 2010; I. Alvarado et al., 2010;
Venkat et al., 2008) and the hydro-power valley presented in (Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011)
are examples of systems satisfying the assumptions made to determine the sets Λi, Ωi, Ω.
For more examples of systems satisfying these assumptions see (Venkat et al., 2006b, 2008,
2006a, 2007).
From the definition of Ωi, Ω and the system decomposition (2-5), the MPC problem can be
written as (Li et al., 2005; Necoara et al., 2008; Venkat et al., 2006a, 2008)
min
u˜(k)
M∑
i=1
φi(u˜(k))
subject to: u˜i(k) ∈ Ωi, for i = 1, . . . ,M
(2-9)
From (2-9) it is required that the constraints can be decoupled. However, this requirement
can be relaxed in order to generalize the formulation of the DMPC scheme and the game
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associated with it (see (C. Portilla et al., 2012a) for an application of the DMPC where the
subsystems are also coupled by the constraints). Based on (2-9), several DMPC schemes
have been proposed. In Section 2.4 details of some approaches are presented.
2.4. Reported Approaches
From (2-9) an insight to formulate DMPC schemes arise: Minimizing each term of the sum
it is possible to minimize the global cost function. Although mathematically correct, the
interactions among subsystems include some additional issues that prevent the veracity of
this insight. In order to tackle such issues several algorithms have been presented. Such
algorithms are focussed on stablish a negotiation among subsystems in order to jointly solve
(2-9) from two perspectives: Single and multi objective optimization perspectives. Below
some procedures are described.
• In (Camponogara et al., 2002) a procedure for solving (2-9) consisting on five steps:
Communication, initialization, optimization, assignation, and implementation was pro-
posed. In this procedure:
– The subsystems communicate their predicted state trajectories (it is assumed that
the subsystems are not coupled by the inputs).
– Based on the current values of xi(k) an upper boundary for ‖xj(k + 1|k)‖2 is
computed.
– The local optimization problem defined by (2-9) is solved including as a constraint
the upper boundary for ‖xj(k + 1|k)‖2 previously computed. Here only the local
cost function is considered.
– The local control action to be applied to the system is selected and a prediction
of the boundary of ‖xj(k + 1|k)‖2 is carried out.
• In (Doan et al., 2008) two iterative procedures for solving (2-9) were proposed. The
first procedure has the following four steps:
1. Each subsystem transmits its assumed local control inputs to the entire network.
2. Based on the information received, the local optimization problem determined by
(2-9) is solved. In this case, the global cost function is used as a cost function,
but only the local control inputs and the control inputs of the subsystems directly
connected to each subsystem (neighbors) are considered as decision variables.
3. The computed control action is sent to a central update location. In this location
the control action to be applied to the system is updated according to a convex
combination of the solutions proposed by each subsystem.
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4. The progress of the solution is computed as the norm of the difference between
the updated and the previous control input.
The second procedure has the following four steps:
1. Each subsystem transmits its assumed local control inputs to the entire network.
2. Based on the information received, the local optimization problem determined by
(2-9) is solved. In this case, the global cost function is used as a cost function,
but only the local control inputs and the control inputs of the subsystems directly
connected to each subsystem (neighbors) are considered as decision variables.
3. Each subsystem receives the control inputs computed for itself by its neighbors.
Then, each subsystem updates the value of the local control action according to
a convex combination.
4. The progress of the solution is computed as the norm of the difference between
the updated and the previous control input.
In both cases, the procedures presented before are carried out until the maximum
allowed number of iterations is reached or until the progress of the solution is less than
some threshold. Then, the first element of the resulting control input is applied to the
system, and the predicted input sequence is shifted and completed with zeros to use
this sequence as initial input for the next time step.
• In (Venkat et al., 2006a) a procedure using a systemwide cost function to solve (2-9)
is proposed. The steps composing this procedure are:
1. Given the measurements of xi(k) and the initial condition for u˜(k), each sub-
system solves the optimization problem (2-9) assuming as a local cost func-
tion a convex sum of all local cost functions, i.e., φi(u˜(k)) =
∑M
r=1 ωrφr(u˜(k)),
0 < ωr < 1,
∑M
r=1 ωr = 1. Here, the local control inputs are considered as the
decision variables.
2. Each subsystem updates its local control action according to a convex combina-
tion including the computed solution of the optimization problem and the previ-
ous value of the control input (the weights of each local convex combination are
determined by the corresponding value of ωr).
3. The progress of the solution is computed as the norm of the difference between
the updated and the previous control input.
The procedure presented before is carried out until the maximum allowed number of
iterations is reached or until the progress of the solution is less than some threshold.
Then, the first element of the resulting control input is applied to the system, and the
predicted input sequence is shifted and completed with zeros to use this sequence as
initial input for the next time step.
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References Advantages Disadvantages
Camponogara et al. (2002), Exchange of the predicted The method is for
Dunbar and Murray (2006), state trajectories to avoid independent
Jia and Krogh (2001) communication problems. subsystems linked only
by the cost function.
Doan et al. (2008), Reduction of the Increment fo the
Necoara et al. (2008) computational complexity computational burden
of a DMPC problem. due to the optimization
over neighboring inputs
in an iterative procedure
Jia and Krogh (2002) Reduction of Increment of the
the communication computational burden
among subsystems. due to the
solution of minimax
local problems.
Venkat et al. (2008), Each local cost function Subsystems are forced
Venkat et al. (2006a), considers the effect of the to cooperate, and the
Venkat et al. (2006b) local control inputs cooperation might
in the entire system behavior. steer the subsystems to
operating points where
they do not
perceive any benefit
Table 2-1.: Advantages and disadvantages of the reviewed DMPC methods.
In the procedures presented before, the approaches presented in (Camponogara et al., 2002;
Doan et al., 2008) use a single objective optimization perspective to deal with the solution
of (2-9), while the approach presented in (Venkat et al., 2006a) uses a multiobjective per-
spective to solve (2-9). Moreover, the approach proposed in (Camponogara et al., 2002)
does not require an iterative procedure to compute the control action to be applied to the
system, while the algorithms proposed in (Doan et al., 2008; Venkat et al., 2006a) require an
iterative procedure to compute the control actions to be applied to the controlled system.
Furthermore, the approaches proposed in (Doan et al., 2008; Venkat et al., 2006a) require
more information exchange among subsystems than the approach proposed in (Camponog-
ara et al., 2002). In conclusion, notwithstanding the efforts dedicated to solve (2-9), there are
still some open issues. In Table 2-1 advantages and disadvantages of the reviewed methods
are summarized.
Note that (2-8) and (2-9) define a coupled optimization problem in which the value of the
cost function of each subsystem depends on the control actions of the remaining subsystems.
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So, it describes a situation where the decisions of one of the elements belonging to a system
affect the decisions of the whole system. Therefore, this situation can be described, analyzed
and solved as a game. In Chapter 3, the use of game theory for analyzing the DMPC problem
is presented.
2.5. Summary
In this Chapter the concept of distributed model predictive control was introduced. The
main characteristics of DMPC were mentioned. Also, advantages and disadvantages of
DMPC were presented, taking as a reference case, completely decentralized control schemes.
Moreover, the importance of DMPC in industry and its relevance for implementing optimal
control schemes in real systems were established.
Additionally, based on the approaches reported in the literature the mathematical formu-
lation of the DMPC was presented. This formulation started with the centralized MPC
problem and finished with an optimization problem where the cost function was expressed
as a sum of several local cost functions (in Appendix A more details of the mathematical
procedure for deriving the DMPC formulation are presented). The value of such cost func-
tions depended on the value of all control inputs, defining a coupled optimization problem
where the decisions of each local controller affected the decisions of the remaining controllers.
This situation can be defined as a game, allowing to use the game theory to formulate and
to analyze the DMPC problem, which is the main contribution of this thesis (see Chapter 3
for more details).
3. Bargaining Game Theory
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter it is addressed the bargaining game theory. A bargaining situation involves
a group of individuals who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more
than one way. If an agreement is not possible, the players carry out an alternative plan
which is determined by the information locally available. In Section 3.2 the main concepts
of game theory are discussed. Also, the classification of games based on the rules about com-
munication among players is presented. In Section 3.3 an in depth definition of bargaining
games and their classification are introduced. The concepts introduced in Section 3.3 are
formalized in Section 3.4. Finally in Section 3.5 a summary of this Chapter is presented.
3.2. The Concept of Game
Game theory is a mathematical method to analyze calculated circumstances where the suc-
cess of an individual is based upon the choices of the others (Myerson, 1991) (an alternative
name for game theory is interactive decision theory (Aumann, 1987)). Such analysis is based
on the following concepts (Von Neumann et al., 1947; Nash, 1953):
• The Game: This is the main concept of game theory. A game is simply the set of
all the rules used to describe the calculated circumstances studied by the game theory.
This allows to reduce the original situation to a mathematical description or model.
• The Play: A play corresponds to every particular instance at which the game is played
(from the beginning to the end).
• The Move: Formally, a move is the occasion of a choice between various alternatives,
to be made either by one of the players, or by some device subject to chance, under
conditions precisely prescribed by the rules of the game.
• The Strategy: An strategy is a preference and/or rule followed by each player in
order to select an alternative. The difference between the strategy and the game is
that the strategy is freely decided by the individuals and they can be accepted or
rejected depending on the rationality of the individuals, and the game establishes rules
that are absolute commands and they cannot be infringed.
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• The Choice: A choice is the selected alternative in a move according to the strategy.
Example 1 illustrates the concepts introduced before.
Example 1 Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Consider the situation presented in Figure 3-1. Such a situation concerns two men arrested,
but the police do not possess enough information for a conviction. Following the separation
of the two men, the police offer both a similar deal: if one testifies against his partner (defects
/ betrays), and the other remains silent (cooperates / assists), the betrayer goes free and the
cooperator receives the full twenty-year sentence. If both remain silent, both are sentenced to
only one year in jail for a minor charge. If each ’rats out’ the other, each receives a five-year
sentence. Each prisoner must choose to either betray or remain silent; the decision of each
is kept quiet. What should they do?
Figure 3-1.: Schematic situation regarding the prisoner’s dilemma.
In the situation described in Example 1:
• The game is determined by the deal offered by the police to the arrested men.
• The game is played one time (after that a decision about the sentence of the men is
taken), then there is only one play.
• Each arrested man has only one chance to select among the alternatives given by the
police. So, there is only one move in this game.
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• The interest of each arrested man is the strategy of each player.
• The specific decision (defects or cooperate) taken by the arrested men are the choices.
Although the concepts regarding game theory have been introduced, until now there is not
an answer for the open question of Example 1: what should they do? In order to give an
answer for this question the concept of solution of the game is introduced. In game theory a
solution means a determination of the amount of satisfaction each individual should expect
to get from the situation (Nash, 1950b). In specific games like bargaining games the concept
of solution is associated with a determination of how much it should be worth to each of
these individuals to have this opportunity to bargain (Nash, 1950b). Thus, in Example 1
the solution of the game is given by the expected amount of years the arrested men want
to have and an explicit rule of the game about communication between the men. Here, an
emphasis is made on the communication rules between the men (and in general among the
individuals involved in the game) because this rules considerably affect the solution of the
game.
With respect to the communication rules, two kind of games arise (Von Neumann et al.,
1947; Nash, 1950b, 1953):
• Cooperative games: in these games:
1. The individuals are able to communicate with each other in order to take a de-
cision.
2. The individuals jointly decide the choices at each play in order to improve the
expected satisfaction.
• Non-cooperative games: such games have the following features:
1. The individuals have to take their decisions without communication among them.
2. Each individual acts independently, then it is not able to collaborate with any of
the other individuals in order to improve its expected satisfaction after a play.
Going back to Example 1, assume the arrested men are expecting to reduce as much as
possible their time in jail. Then, assuming that the prisoners are not able to communicate
with each other (a non-cooperative situation), regardless of what the other prisoner decide,
each prisoner reduce its time in jail by betraying the other. So, the expected satisfaction after
a play is given by the fact that both prisoners betray the other, even though their individual
“prize” would be greater if they cooperated. However, in the case that the arrested men
are able to communicate each other (and assuming that the prisoners are perfectly rational,
i.e., the decisions taken by the prisoners obey to the profit maximization of all of them) this
situation does not happen. They communicate each other their decisions and based on the
deal offered by the police the choice of each one is remain silent, which are the choices giving
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the maximum expected satisfaction after a play (note that the solution of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game is affected by the communication rules and that cooperation rules arise as a
consequence of the communication among individuals as it was stated before).
As a consequence of the division of the games in cooperative and non-cooperative, several
real problems (mainly economic) have been classified as cooperative and non-cooperative
situations (Von Neumann et al., 1947; Nash, 1950b) depending on how the problem is ad-
dressed. From the cooperative point maybe the most studied problem is the bargaining
problem (Nash, 1950b; Harsanyi, 1963; Akira, 2005; Peters, 1992). The bargaining problem
is defined by a situation in which several individuals have the opportunity to collaborate for
mutual benefit in more than one way (the way of cooperation depends of the definition of
the benefit of each individual).
3.3. Bargaining Games
As it was stated at the end of Section 3.2, a bargaining situation involves a group of indi-
viduals who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than one way.
In the simpler case, no action taken by one of the individuals without the consent of the
others can affect the well-being of the others (Nash, 1950b). The economic situations of
state trading between two nations, and of negotiation between employer and labor union
may be regarded as bargaining problems (Nash, 1950b). Roughly speaking, all bargaining
situations have the following five elements:
1. A group of individuals involved in the bargaining.
2. A mutual benefit which is the objective of the bargaining, often defined as a profit
function.
3. A decision space composed by all the available choices of the subsystems.
4. A disagreement point defined by the minimum expected satisfaction for the bargaining.
5. An utopia point defined by the set of choices where all the individuals involved in the
bargaining achieve at the same time their maximum benefit.
From Example 1, the group of individuals is composed by the arrested men, the mutual
objective is to reduce as much as possible the time spent in jail, the decision space is defined
by the deal offered by the police, a disagreement point can be defined as the maximum
number of years each prisoner accepts to spent in jail, and the utopia point is achieved when
the arrested men decide to remain silent.
In order to make a mathematical treatment of bargaining, a numerical utility have been
proposed in (Nash, 1950b) to express the preferences or tastes of each individual. By this
means it is possible to bring into a mathematical model the desire of each individual to
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maximize his gain in bargaining. However, depending of the complexity of the situation
analyzed the resulting model can be intractable. Then, an idealization of the situation is
considered in order to determine the expected satisfaction at the end of the play. For example
in (Nash, 1950b) proposed to idealize the bargaining problem by assuming that:
• The individuals are highly rational.
• Each individual can accurately compare his desires for various things.
• The individuals are equal in bargaining skill.
• Each individual has full knowledge of the tastes and preferences of the others.
All the situations satisfying these requirements are known as symmetric bargaining games.
For symmetric bargaining games in (Nash, 1950b, 1953) proposed an axiomatic characteriz-
ation of the solution based on the fact that if all individuals have the same characteristics,
then the expected satisfaction after a play should be the same. Assume that (in Example 1)
the arrested men satisfy the symmetry conditions established in (Nash, 1950b, 1953), then
the solutions satisfying the axiomatic characterization of bargaining games are:
• The prisoner A confesses, the prisoner B confesses.
• The prisoner A remains silent, the prisoner B remains silent.
Note that symmetry conditions imply that all the individuals have the same disagreement
point in order to achieve the same utility at the end of the play.
Although symmetric games have been widely studied, their symmetry conditions can be
heavily restrictive in real applications, because often:
• The way of thinking of the individuals is different.
• The bargaining skills of the individuals are different.
• The individuals do not have the same interests.
As a consequence of these differences among the individuals, the bargaining game becomes
in a non-symmetric bargaining game. By definition, a non-symmetric bargaining game is a
bargaining situation where the individuals do not satisfy the symmetry conditions (Peters,
1992). In Example 1 consider that one of the arrested men wants to maximize the years spent
in jail, and the other wants to minimize the years spent in jail. In this case a non-symmetric
situation arises. The solution for the resulting game is then:
• The prisoner A remains silent, the prisoner B confesses.
• The prisoner A confesses, the prisoner B remains silent.
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Symmetric Bargaining Games Non-Symmetric Bargaining Games
Individuals are highly rational Individuals are highly rational
Each individual can accurately compare Each individual can accurately compare
his desires for various things his desires for various things
The individuals are equal in bargaining The individuals are not necessarily equal
skills in bargaining skills
Each individual has full knowledge of each individual does not necessarily have
the tastes and preferences of the others perfect knowledge of the tastes and the
preferences of others
The individuals have the same The individuals do not necessarily have
disagreement point the same disagreement point
The individuals have the same way of The individuals do not necessarily have
thinking the same way of thinking
The individuals have the same interests The individuals do not necessarily have
the same interests
Table 3-1.: Comparison of the assumptions made about the individuals involved in the bar-
gaining in symmetric and non-symmetric bargaining games.
Each solution presented before arises depending of the interests of A and B. Table 3-1
compares symmetric and non-symmetric bargaining games, Figure 3-2 illustrates the relation
among the different kind of games described until here in this work, and Section 3.4 presents
a mathematical background about bargaining games.
3.4. Mathematical Formulation
Let us first introduce some notation used through the remainder of this chapter. Let N
be the set of players, N = {1, 2, . . . ,M}, M ≥ 2. For α, β ∈ RM , let αβ denote the
vector [α1β1, . . . , αMβM ], β ≥ α denote the inequality βi ≥ αi for every i ∈ N (similarly for
β > α), and β ≤ α denote βi ≤ αi for every i ∈ N (similarly for β < α). Let T ⊂ RM ,
then αT := {γ ∈ RM : γ = αβ for some β ∈ T} and α + T = T + α := {ν ∈ RM : ν =
α+β for some β ∈ T}. Also, let a ∈ R, then aα := [aα1, . . . , aαM ] and aT := {aα : α ∈ T}.
Mathematically, a gameG is defined in an strategic form as a tupleG = (N, {Ωi}i∈N , {φi}i∈N)
where:
• N = {1, . . . ,M} is the set of players.
• Ωi is the decision space of player i determined by the the game, i.e., is the set of feasible
decisions of player i.
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Figure 3-2.: Relationship among the different games described in this work. Such relation
is determined by the classification of the games based on the rules about the
communication among the players . In this Figure, bold squares defines the
class of games considered in this work.
• φi : Ω1 × ΩM → R is the profit function of the i-th player.
Often, φi quantifies the preferences of player i (and determines its strategy), and gives to
each player some degree of rationality (Akira, 2005). Note that the mathematical definition
of a game involves all concepts and elements described in Section 3.3. However, the decision
process is not explicitly captured. Regarding the decision process, the communication rules
should be specified, i.e., it is required to define if the players are able to communicate each
other or not. In this case, it is assumed that:
• The players are able to communicate with each other.
• The players are able to “bargain” in order to achieve a common goal
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Since it is assumed that the players are able to “bargain” in order to achieve a common goal,
the game G can be analyzed as a bargaining game following the Nash theories about such
games. A bargaining game is a situation involving a set of players who have the opportunity
to collaborate for mutual benefit by an agreement on a joint plan of action (Nash, 1950b,
1953). If an agreement is not possible, the players carry out an alternative plan which is
determined by the information locally available. The benefit perceived by the player when
an agreement is not possible is called disagreement point. Mathematically, a bargaining
game is defined as follows (Peters, 1992):
Definition 1 Bargaining Game:
A bargaining game for N is a pair (S, d) where:
1. S denotes the decision space of the game, defined as a nonempty closed subset of RM
(Closedness of the feasible set S is required for mathematical convenience.).
2. d ∈ int(S), d being the disagreement point.
3. ζi(S) maximum profit available in S for player i, i.e., ζi(S) := max{φi : (φi)i∈N ∈ S}
exists for every i ∈ N .
Here φi : R
M −→ R denotes the profit function of player i for i = 1, . . . ,M , S denotes
the feasible set of profit functions, and ζi(S) denotes the utopia point of subsystem i for
i = 1, . . . ,M . Moreover, if the feasible set S is convex then the bargaining game (S, d) is
called a convex bargaining game 
In general, the outcome of a game (S, d) is a tuple ϕ(S, d) = (φ1, . . . , φM) of profits received
by the players. If any player does not cooperate then the corresponding position in ϕ(S, d)
is replaced by its disagreement point. Hence, if all subsystems decide not to cooperate
ϕ(S, d) = (d1, . . . , dM). Thus, the problem is how do a player gets an outcome of the game
(S, d) given that every player wants to maximize its own profit? To overcome this issue,
bargaining games have been classified in two classes:
• Symmetric games.
• Non-symmetric games.
The properties and the outcome of both classes of bargaining games are discussed in Sub-
sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.
3.4.1. Symmetric Bargaining Games
A bargaining game (S, d) is called symmetric if d1 = d2 = . . . = dM , and for every φ ∈ S any
point φ˜ ∈ RM arising from φ by performing some permutation of its coordinates is also in S.
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If a bargaining game (S, d) does not satisfy these conditions, then it is called non-symmetric
bargaining game (Peters, 1992).
In order to derive a solution of a symmetric bargaining game, Nash (1950b, 1953) stated that
the solution ϕ(S, d) should satisfy Axioms 1-4. At the beginning, these axioms were proposed
in order to characterize the outcome of two-person symmetric bargaining games. However,
they have also been used to characterize the outcome of n-person symmetric bargaining
games (see (Akira, 2005; Harsanyi, 1963; Peters, 1992) and the references therein).
Axiom 1 Symmetry:
If (S, d) is a symmetric bargaining game, then ϕ1(S, d) = . . . = ϕM(S, d) 
Axiom 2 Weak Pareto optimality:
For T ⊂ RM let
W (T ) := {α ∈ T : there is no β ∈ T with β > α}
denote the weakly Pareto optimal subset of T . Then, for the game (S, d), ϕ(S, d) ∈ W (S) 
Axiom 3 Scale transformation covariance:
For the game (S, d), and all a, b ∈ RM with a ≥ 0 and (aS + b, ad+ b), ϕ(aS + b, ad + b) =
aϕ(S, d) + b 
Axiom 4 Independence of irrelevant alternatives:
For all pair of games (S, d), (T, e), if d = e, T ⊂ S, and ϕ(S, d) ∈ T , then ϕ(S, d) = ϕ(T, e)

The motivation for each axiom was:
• Axiom 1: If the description of the bargaining game does not contain any information
that enables a meaningful distinction between the players, the solution should not
distinguish between the players either.
• Axiom 2: The players collectively are not able to improve their solution outcome.
• Axiom 3: The solution is independent of the representations of the preferences of the
players.
• Axiom 4: If the feasible set shrinks but the solution outcome remains feasible, then
the solution outcome for the smaller feasible set should be the same as the solution for
the original game.
In this context, a function assigning to each player of the game (S, d) the maximum benefit,
where the resulting tuple ϕ(S, d) satisfies Axioms 1-4 is called Nash function of the game
(S, d), and the tuple ϕ(S, d) is called symmetric Nash bargaining solution of the game (S, d).
From (Harsanyi, 1963), the symmetric Nash bargaining solution of any game (S, d) is defined
as follows:
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Definition 2 Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution
For every (S, d) with convex feasible set, let ϕ(S, d) be the outcome of (S, d), where the
function
φ 7−→ Πi∈N(φi − di)
is maximized over the set {φ ∈ S : φ ≥ d}, with φ = (φ1, . . . , φM). The product Πi∈N(φi−di)
is called the symmetric Nash product of the game (S, d) 
The solution presented in Definition 2 corresponds to an extension to n-person bargaining
games of the solution proposed by Nash for two-person bargaining games (Harsanyi, 1963).
Moreover, as a consequence of Axioms 1-4 and based on Definition 2, arise the following
Proposition and Lemma:
Proposition 1 The symmetric Nash bargaining solution ϕ(S, d) of the bargaining game
(S, d) is well defined, i.e., ϕ(S, d) is unique, and it is possible to derive a geometrical char-
acterization for ϕ(S, d) from the symmetric Nash product Πi∈N(φi − di) 
Proof 1 See (Peters, 1992) 
Lemma 1 Consider the bargaining game (S, d). Let γ ∈ W (S) with γ > d. Then γ =
ϕ(S, d) if and only if∑
i∈N
φi
φi − di =
∑
i∈N
γi
φi − di (3-1)
supports Θ at γ 
Proof 2 See (Peters, 1992) 
Until here, the main elements of the axiomatic bargaining game theory proposed by Nash
have been introduced. As it was stated at the beginning of the current section, this axiomatic
game theory was formulated to characterize the outcome of symmetric bargaining games.
However, several real bargaining situations cannot be analyzed as such games. In order to
analyze the remaining situations, they have been formulated as non-symmetric games. In
the next section, properties of such games are discussed.
3.4.2. Non-Symmetric Bargaining Games
As it was stated in Subsection 3.4.1, a non-symmetric bargaining game is a bargaining
game such that the conditions of symmetry are not satisfied. Mainly, the violation of the
condition d1 = d2 = . . . = dM makes the game (S, d) non-symmetric. Consequently with the
definition of non-symmetric bargaining game, Axiom 1 is not satisfied for such games. Then,
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additional axioms should be included in order to characterize the outcome of non-symmetric
bargaining games. In such a way, Axioms 5 and 6 have been proposed in (Peters, 1992) and
(Harsanyi, 1963) respectively (Axiom 6 is an example of the general principle of the game
theory (Driessen, 1991; Peters, 1992)).
Axiom 5 Individual Rationality:
For every bargaining game (S, d) the outcome of the game ϕ(S, d) satisfies ϕ(S, d) > d 
Axiom 6 Consistency:
For α ∈ RM , ∅ 6=  L ⊂ N , T ∈ RM , a game (T, d) and a solution ϕ(T, d):
• α L denotes the vector in R L obtained by deleting the coordinates of α belonging to N
but not belonging to  L, i.e., deleting the coordinates of α belonging to N\ L.
• T L := {β L : β ∈ T}
• (T, α) L := {β L : β ∈ T, βN\ L = αN\ L}.
• The tuple (T, ϕ(T, d)) L denote the utility available for the collective  L, if the subsystem
i outside  L receive ϕi(T, d).
Then, for all games (S, d), (T, d), and every ∅ 6=  L ⊂ N if the utility available for the
collective  L is the same for the players in (S, d) and (T, d), the outcome of the game (S, d)
for the collective  L is the same as the outcome of the game (T, d) for the collective  L, i.e., if
(S, ϕ(S, d)) L = (T, ϕ(T, d)) L, ϕ L(S, d) = ϕ L(T, d) 
Let
• RM+ := {α ∈ RM : αi > 0, for all i ∈ N}.
• ℏ is an ordered (m+ 1)-tuple ℏ = (N1, . . . , Nm, w), called weighted hierarchy, where:
1. (N1, . . . , Nm) is a partition of N (i.e., the sets N l, l = 1, . . . , m are pairwise
disjoint nonempty sets whose union equals to N).
2. w ∈ RM+ with
∑
i∈N l wi = 1 for every l = 1, . . . , m.
• P (T ) := {α ∈ T : there is no β ∈ T with β ≥ α, β 6= α} denotes the Pareto optimal
subset of T .
•  L+(T, γ) := {i ∈  L : there exists α ∈ T with αi > γi}.
• argmax{f(α) : α ∈ T} := {α ∈ T : f(α) ≥ f(β) for all β ∈ T}.
Then, taking in mind Axioms 2-6 and the definition of weighted hierarchy a bargaining
solution for a nonsymmetric game (S, d) is associated by lexicographically maximizing “Nash
products” in accordance to the partitions and the weights in ℏ (Peters, 1992).
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Definition 3 Nonsymmetric bargaining solution (Peters, 1992, Definition 2.14):
Let ℏ = (N1, . . . , Nm, w) be a weighted hierarchy of N . Let Sl, l = 0, . . . , m denote the
feasible set for the partition N l. Then, the sets Sl are defined as follows:
S0 := {φ ∈ RM : φ ∈ P (S), φ ≥ d}
S1 := argmax{Π(φi − di)wi : i ∈ N1, φ ∈ S0}
S2 :=
{
argmax{Π(φi − di)wi : i ∈ N2+(S1, d), φ ∈ S1} if N2+(S1, d) 6= ∅
S1 otherwise
...
Sl :=
{
argmax{Π(φi − di)wi : i ∈ N l+(Sl−1, d), φ ∈ Sl−1} if N l+(Sl−1, d) 6= ∅
Sl−1 otherwise
...
Sm :=
{
argmax{Π(φi − di)wi : i ∈ Nm+ (Sm−1, d), φ ∈ Sm−1} if Nm+ (Sm−1, d) 6= ∅
Sm−1 otherwise
where N l+(S
l−1, d) := {i ∈ N l : there exists φ ∈ Sl−1 with φi > di}, l = 1, . . . , m 
From Definition 3 the Lemma 2 arises. This Lemma implies that the solution of a non-
symmetric game (S, d) assigning the unique element of Sm is well-defined.
Lemma 2 Let ℏ be a weighted hierarchy associated with a non-symmetric game (S, d). Let
Sm be the set defined in Definition 3. Then |Sm| = 1, i.e., Sm only has one element (Sm is
a singleton) 
Proof 3 See (Peters, 1992) 
In addition to Lemma 2 it is possible to demonstrate that ϕℏ(S, d) satisfies Axioms 2-6,
hence is the Nash bargaining solution of any non-symmetric bargaining game (S, d) (Peters,
1992). Also, ϕℏ(S, d) satisfies Proposition 1 and Lemma 1.
Although, axiomatic characterization of the outcome of bargaining games proposed by Nash
(1950b, 1953), and by Harsanyi (1963) allows to analyze several real situations, such char-
acterization has been developed for static decision environments. Then, in order to analyze
a DMPC problem as a bargaining game the concept of discrete-time dynamic bargaining
game should be introduced. Furthermore, some concepts presented in this section should be
redefined because the DMPC problem is focused on the minimization of the cost function
associated with each subsystem, and the game theory is focused on the maximization of the
profit function of each player. In Chapter 4 these issues are addressed.
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3.5. Summary
In this Chapter the key concepts of game theory were introduced: the game, the play, the
move, the strategy, and the choice. These concepts were also illustrated with the widely
known Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Additionally, the classification of games was discussed
considering the rules about communication among the players as the differentiating factor.
As a consequence, the games can be classified into cooperative and non-cooperative games.
These two kinds of games were also illustrated using the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Since in DMPC schemes the subsystems are able to cooperate in this chapter an special
attention was paid to cooperative games. Particularly, bargaining games were widely dis-
cussed. For such games the concept was discussed in depth. From such discussion, conditions
for considering bargaining games symmetric or not were presented. Then, the mathematical
formalization of the concept of bargaining game was presented, and the conditions for its
symmetry were also mathematized, and the outcome of both symmetric and non-symmetric
bargaining games were characterized using the axiomatic bargaining game theory proposed
by Nash (1950b, 1953), and by Harsanyi (1963) for such games. These concepts and axioms
will be used in Chapter 4 to analyze and characterize the DMPC problem as a bargaining
game.
4. Distributed Model Predictive Control:
A Bargaining Approach
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter the DMPC problem formulated in Chapter 2 is analyzed as a bargaining
game. In Section 4.2 the motivation to select a bargaining approach to the DMPC problem
is presented. Since the axiomatic bargaining theory presented in Chapter 3 was developed for
static decision environments in this chapter such theory is extended to bargaining situations
where the decision environment, the decision space and/or the disagreement point have
dynamic rules of change. Such situations were called discrete-time bargaining games. In
Section 4.3 the concept of discrete-time dynamic bargaining game is formally defined and
the conditions for the symmetry of these games are stated. In Section 4.4 the DMPC problem
is analyzed as a particular case of discrete-time dynamic bargaining game, and the conditions
for the symmetry for these games are established. In order to solve in a distributed way
DMPC games a negotiation model is proposed in Section 4.5. In this section, the closed-
loop stability of the controlled system is also discussed, assuming that the control actions
are computed as the solution of a DMPC game. Finally, Section 4.5 presents a summary of
this chapter.
4.2. Motivation
According to the formulation of the DMPC problem presented in Chapter 2 and considering
the concepts of game theory presented in Chapter 3, the DMPC problem can be viewed as
calculated circumstance where the success of each subsystem is based upon the choices of
the other subsystems: the DMPC can be viewed as a game. In this circumstance:
• The rules are provided by the physical and operational constraints of the whole system
(the DMPC game).
• Each time step k corresponds to an instance at which the optimal control action should
be computed (a play of the DMPC game).
• Also, each time step k is an occasion for each subsystem to choice between various
alternatives a local control action (the choice in a DMPC game). If an iterative pro-
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cedure is carried out to compute the local control actions, then the iterations are the
choices in such DMPC game.
• The moves are determined by the procedure to solve the game, often called negotiation
model.
But, as a difference with the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (see Chapter 3 for details) in the
DMPC problem infinite plays are played (although in simulations the control schemes are
tested in a finite time -thus k has a finite value-, in real control applications it is possible
to assume that k → ∞ because the control actions should work 24 hours per day, 7 days
per week). Therefore, the DMPC problem can be analyzed as a game (with strategic form)
GDMPC = (N, {Ωi}i∈N , {φi(u˜(k))}i∈N) where N = {1, . . . ,M} is the set of subsystems, and
Ωi and φi(u˜(k)) : Ω1 × . . . × ΩM → R are the set of feasible control actions and the cost
function of subsystem i respectively (in this formulation the feasible sets have been assumed
time-invariant and separable -see Chapter 2 for details-, however this is not a requirement of
the proposed method. In (C. Portilla et al., 2012a) an application of the proposed method
is done for a system with non-separable time-variant feasible sets).
Since the game GDMPC comes from a distributed control situation this game belongs to the
cooperative games. Additionally, in the DMPC problem all subsystems have a common goal.
In this sense, the DMPC problem can be viewed as a situation involving a group of indi-
viduals who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than one way:
a bargaining game. In this bargaining situation, the disagreement point is determined
by threshold of maximum loss of performance. This guarantees that the performance of
each subsystem is less or equal to such threshold.
Despite of the similarities between the (S, d) and the GDMPC, the DMPC game has infinite
plays and its decision environment has a dynamic evolution. These facts make that the ori-
ginal bargaining game theory should be extended in order to have a mathematical framework
to analyze bargaining games with the same features of GDMPC. In this way, the concept of
discrete-time dynamic bargaining game is introduced. In Section 4.3 the discrete-time dy-
namic bargaining game is defined, and the conditions of symmetry of such game are also
introduced. Then, based on the definition of this game the DMPC problem is analyzed as a
symmetric and non-symmetric bargaining game.
4.3. Discrete-Time Dynamic Bargaining Game
Let a discrete-time dynamic bargaining game refers to a situation where at each time step a
static bargaining game (S, d) is solved depending on the dynamic evolution of the decision
environment, where the dynamic evolution of the decision environment is determined by a
state vector x(k) ∈ Rn and by an input vector u(k) ∈ Rm, with x(k) ∈ X and u(k) ∈ U,
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X and U being the feasible sets for x(k) and u(k) respectively. In this game, we assume
that the feasible set and/or the disagreement point can change with time. Mathematically,
a discrete-time dynamic bargaining game is defined as follows:
Definition 4 Discrete-time dynamic bargaining game:
A discrete-time dynamic bargaining game for the set of players N is a sequence of games
{(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0, where:
1. Θ(k) is a nonempty closed subset of RM containing the feasible values of the profit
function of each player, k = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
2. η(k) is the disagreement point, η(k) ∈ int(Θ(k)) for k = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
3. ζi(Θ(k)) := max{φi(k) : (φi(k))i∈N ∈ Θ(k)} exists for every i ∈ N at each time step k,
i.e., for k = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
4. There exists functions fi ∈ Rni, g ∈ Rz, hi ∈ R, i = 1, . . . ,M , determining the dynamic
evolution of the decision environment and the disagreement point of player i, and the
dynamic evolution of the feasible set, such that:
xi(k + 1) = fi(x(k), u(k))
ηi(k + 1) = hi(x(k), u(k), η(k))
Θ(k + 1) = g(x(k), u(k),Θ(k))
with xi(k) ∈ Xi, Xi ⊂ X, z the dimension of the feasible set, and u(k) = [uT1 (k), . . . , uTM(k)]
the vector of actions taken by the players affecting the decision environment.
5. There exists a tuple φ(x(k), u(k)) ∈ RM such that φ(x(k), u(k)) ∈ Θ(k), φi(x(k), u(k))
being the profit function of the i-th player.
If gi(x(k), u(k),Θ(k)) is a convex function for i = 1 . . . ,M , then Θ(k) is convex and the
game {(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0 is a convex discrete-time bargaining game. Moreover, the condition
η(k) ∈ int(Θ(k)) is added for mathematical convenience .
From Definitions 1 and 4, and from the symmetry conditions stated for (S, d) a bargaining
game {(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0 is called symmetric if:
• η1(k) = . . . = ηM (k) for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞.
• For every φ(k) ∈ Θ(k) any point φ˜(k) ∈ RM arising from φ(k) by performing some
permutation of its coordinates is also inside Θ(k) for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞.
Moreover, since a game {(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0 is a sequence of static bargaining games the out-
come of such games is given by the sequence of solutions {ϕ(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0, whose elements
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(according to Definition 2 and assuming {(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0 symmetric and convex) are de-
termined by the elements of the set {(φ1(k), . . . , φM(k)) ∈ Θ(k) : φ(k) ≥ η(k))} where the
function
φ(k) 7−→ Πi∈N (φi(k)− ηi(k)) (4-1)
is maximized at the time step k.
Note that the outcome of the game {(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0 at fixed time step k given by (4-1)
has the same properties than the solution of the symmetric bargaining game (S, d), i.e.,
satisfies Axioms 1-4, Proposition 1, and Lemma 1. Furthermore, under the assumption
of symmetry of {(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0 these properties hold for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. However,
symmetric conditions for discrete-time dynamic bargaining games are heavily restrictive for
real life systems, mainly because real systems (and in particular real large-scale systems) are
composed by several different subsystems with different time evolution equations. Then, a
solution for non-symmetric discrete-time dynamic bargaining games should be derived.
At time step k, let P (T (k)) denote the Pareto optimal subset of T (k), let  L+(T (k), γ(k)) :=
{i ∈  L : there exists α(k) ∈ T (k) with αi(k) > γi(k)}, and let argmax{f(α(k)) : α ∈
T (k)} := {α(k) ∈ T (k) : f(α(k)) ≥ f(β(k)) for all β(k) ∈ T (k)}. Then, based on Definition
3, considering Axioms 2-6, and assuming ℏ fixed for N at each time step k, k = 1, 2, . . . the
solution of the non-symmetric game {(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0 is a sequence {ϕℏ(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0 : =
{ϕℏ(Θ(0), η(0)), ϕℏ(Θ(1), η(1)), . . .}, where the element ϕℏ(Θ(k), η(k)) (at fixed time step k)
is associated with the lexicographic maximization of Nash products on the sets:
Θ0(k) := {φ(k) ∈ RM : φ(k) ∈ P (Θ(k)), φ(k) 6 η(k)}
Θ1(k) := argmax{Π(φi(k)− ηi(k))wi : i ∈ N1, φ(u˜(k) ∈ Θ0(k)}
Θ2(k) :=

argmax{Π(φi(k)− ηi(k))wi : i ∈ N2+(Θ1(k), η(k)), φ(k) ∈ Θ1}
if N2+(Θ
1(k), η(k)) 6= ∅
Θ1(k) otherwise
...
Θm(k) :=

argmax{Π(φi(k)− ηi(k))wi : i ∈ Nm+ (Θm−1(k), η(k)), φ(k) ∈ Θm−1(k)}
if Nm+ (Θ
m−1(k), η(k)) 6= ∅
Θm−1(k) otherwise
(4-2)
where N l+(Θ
l−1(k), η(k)) := {i ∈ N l : there exists φ(k) ∈ Θl−1(k) with φi(k) > ηi(k)}, l =
1, . . . , m. Note that at fixed time step k, {ϕℏ(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0 has the same properties of
ϕℏ(S, d) and that properties are satisfied for k = 1, 2, . . .
4.4. Distributed Model Predictive Control Game
As it was stated in Chapter 3, the axiomatic bargaining game theory have been developed
for games with a static decision environment. With the purpose of extending the original
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axiomatic theory to cover games with dynamic decision environments few approaches have
been presented (see (Duggan and Kalandrakis, 2009; Haurie and Tolwinski, 1982a,b) and
the references therein). These approaches focus mainly on developing procedures to find
the coalition-formation-based solution of the game, understanding a coalition as a set of
players that decide to use the same strategies. But, in the case of the DMPC problem
the coalitions are a consequence of the negotiation among subsystems and they are not an
objective of the negotiation model as in (Akira, 2005; Duggan and Kalandrakis, 2009; Haurie
and Tolwinski, 1982a,b). This is due to the coalition-formation-based solution of the DMPC
problem restricts the subsystems to use the same control actions, which is hard restrictive
and that maybe generates loss of performance of the closed-loop system. Therefore, in this
section the axiomatic theory of bargaining games is used to characterize the outcome of the
DMPC problem.
4.4.1. Formulation
In this section the DMPC problem presented in Chapter 2 is formulated as a discrete-time
dynamic bargaining game. With this purpose recall that (same assumptions were made in
(Venkat et al., 2008; I. Alvarado et al., 2010; F. Valencia et al., 2010)):
• φi(u˜(k); x(k)) denotes the cost function for subsystem i, i = 1, . . . ,M , where the
notation (u˜(k); x(k)) indicates that the function φi depends on u˜(k), and x(k) is a
time variant parameter.
• It is assumed that the evolution of x(k) is given by the linear state update equation
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k)
where A and B are obtained by linearizing the model describing the behavior of the
whole system.
• φi(u˜(k)) is a quadratic positive convex function of u˜(k) for i = 1, . . . ,M .
• It is assumed that the subsystems are able to “bargain” in order to achieve a common
goal: to maintain both the local and the global system performance by driving the
states of the system to their reference values.
Let Υ(k) := {φi(u˜(k)) : u˜(k) ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ N} be a feasible set of cost functions. Since Ω
is time-invariant for i = 1, . . . ,M the feasible set Υ(k) is also time invariant, i.e., Υ(1) =
Υ(2) = . . . = Υ. Moreover, since Ω is closed and convex, and by the continuity and convexity
of φi(u˜(k)) with respect to u˜(k), the set Υ is closed and convex. Note that Υ defines a set
of possible values of the cost function of every subsystem given the set Ω. Then, Υ is the
decision space in the DMPC problem treated in this work.
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Once defined the decision space in the DMPC problem, it is required to define the disagree-
ment point. However, in the literature the unique guideline for such definition is given by
the definition of bargaining game (Nash, 1950b):
The disagreement point is the benefit perceived by the player when an agreement is not
possible. Such benefit is associated with an alternative plan carried out by the player in
this situation, which is determined by the information locally available.
Based on the definition of bargaining game, Nash (1953) establishes
The disagreement point should give to the players a strong incentive to increase their
demands as much as possible without losing compatibility.
Therefore, following these statements let us define the disagreement point for the DMPC
problem addressed in this work as
ηi(k + 1) =
{
ηi(k)− α(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k))) if ηi(k) ≥ φi(u˜(k))
ηi(k) + (φi(u˜(k))− ηi(k)) if ηi(k) < φi(u˜(k))
∀i ∈ N , with 0 < α < 1. In this definition u˜(k) is selected as the sequence of control actions
solving the optimization problem associated with the solution of the game (see Section 4.5
for details).
With this definition of the disagreement point, if subsystem i decides to cooperate then
it can improve its expected performance by reducing the disagreement point in a factor
α[ηi(k)−φi(u˜(k))]. But, if subsystem i decides not to cooperate its expected performance is
increased by a factor [φi(u˜(k))− ηi(k)] in order to make possible that subsystem i begins to
cooperate few time steps ahead. It is worth to notice that ηi(k)+(φi(u˜(k))−ηi(k)) = φi(u˜(k).
Then, for the non-cooperating subsystems the disagreement point at time step k+1 is equals
to φi(u˜(k)). Hence, the non-cooperative situation persists only if φi(u˜(k))→∞ as k →∞.
Let Jei(ei(ηi(k))) := e
T
i (ηi(k))ei(ηi(k)), where ei(ηi(k);φi(u˜(k))) is the difference between the
disagreement point ηi(k) and the cost function φi(u˜(k)) at time step k. Then, according to
(Haykin, 1995):
• The expression ηi(k)−α(ηi(k)−φi(u˜(k))), ηi(k) > φi(u˜(k)), defines the update equation
for solving (in an iterative way) the least-squares problem: minηi(k) Jei(ei(ηi(k))).
• The expression ηi(k) + (φi(u˜(k)) − ηi(k)), ηi(k) < φi(u˜(k)) the update equation for
solving the optimization problem: maxηi(k) Jei(ei(ηi(k))).
Thus, for both cooperating and non-cooperating subsystems the disagreement point tends
to the optimal expected value of the cost function φ(u˜(k)), given the behavior of the states
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x(k). Notice that in the definition of discrete-time dynamic bargaining game it is desired
that η(k) ∈ int(Θ(k)). However, in the definition of ηi(k) there are not constraints related
with this condition. Then, the value of the disagreement point can lies on the boundary of
the feasible set. If the value of the cost function is on the boundary two situations arise:
1. There exists a feasible search direction to minimize the local cost function. This implies
that there is a set of feasible control actions that satisfies the minimum expected
performance. As a consequence a cooperative situation is originated (see Section 4.5 for
details about cooperative situations in DMPC under the proposed negotiation model).
2. There is no a feasible search direction to minimize the local cost function. In this
case the optimization algorithm stops, deriving in a non-cooperative situation (see
Section 4.5 for details about non-cooperative situation in DMPC under the proposed
negotiation model).
The definition of the DMPC problem as a discrete-time dynamic bargaining is completed by
defining the utopia point. Let ζi(Υ) denote the utopia point of subsystem i (in a DMPC
problem) defined as ζi(Υ) := min {φi(u˜(k)) : φi(u˜(k)) ∈ Υ}. From such a definition ζi(Υ)
exist for every i ∈ N . Then,
The DMPC problem can be analyzed as a discrete-time dynamic bargaining game
{(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 , where
1. Υ := {φi(u˜(k)) : u˜(k) ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ N} is the decision space.
2. η(k) := (η1(k), . . . , ηM(k)) is the disagreement point, whose evolution is de-
termined by
ηi(k + 1) =
{
ηi(k)− α(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k))) if ηi(k) ≥ φi(u˜(k))
ηi(k) + (φi(u˜(k))− ηi(k)) if ηi(k) < φi(u˜(k))
∀i ∈ N , with 0 < α < 1.
3. ζi(Υ) := min {φi(u˜(k)) : φi(u˜(k)) ∈ Υ} is the utopia point.
4. The dynamic evolution of the decision environment is given by the model of the
controlled system.
Note that in {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 only the disagreement point depends on the time step k, and
that ζi(Υ) is redefined because the objective of the DMPC is to minimize the cost function
φi(u˜(k)), ∀i ∈ N . In Subsections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, conditions for the symmetry of the game
{(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0, and the axiomatic characterization of the outcome of {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 under
symmetric and non-symmetric conditions are presented.
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4.4.2. Symmetric Game
Based on the symmetry conditions for the game {(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0, a symmetric DMPC game
{(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 can be defined as follows:
Definition 5 Symmetric DMPC game:
A DMPC game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 is symmetric if η1(k) = η2(k) = . . . = ηM(k) for k =
0, 1, 2, . . ., and for every φ(u˜(k)) ∈ Υ any point φ˜(u˜(k)) ∈ RM arising from φ(u˜(k)) by
performing some permutation of its coordinates is also in Υ 
Recall that φi(u˜(k)) is a quadratic function of u˜(k), then it can be written as (I. Alvarado
et al., 2010; F. Valencia et al., 2010)
φi(u˜(k)) = u˜
T (k)Quuiu˜(k) + x
T (k)Qxuiu˜(k) + x
T (k)Qxxix(k)
Hence, if η1(k) = . . . = ηM (k) for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., then a condition for which {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0
is symmetric is that Quui = Quuj, Qxui = Qxuj, and Qxxi = Qxxj for all i, j ∈ N . This
condition comes from the following equality:
u˜T (k)Quuiu˜(k) + x
T (k)Qxuiu˜(k)+x
T (k)Qxxix(k) =
u˜T (k)Quuj u˜(k) + x
T (k)Qxuju˜(k) + x
T (k)Qxxjx(k)
for all i, j ∈ N . Such conditions are satisfied when the subsystems have the same objectives,
i.e., when the following statements are satisfied:
• fi(x(k), u(k)) = fj(x(k), u(k)).
• gi(x(k), u(k)) = gj(x(k), u(k)).
• hi(x(k), u(k)) = hj(x(k), u(k)).
• Xi = Xj for all i, j ∈ N .
• Ui = Uj for all i, j ∈ N
Systems described by partial differential equations (like the heat benchmark presented in (F.
Valencia et al., 2009)) or homogeneous systems, i.e., systems whose subsystems has the same
mathematical description (as the four thank system presented in Chapter 5) are examples
where the formulation of a DMPC controller derives in a symmetric game.
Assume that the game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 is symmetric. Since the objective of the DMPC is to
minimize the local cost function φi(u˜(k)) for all i ∈ N , and based on (4-1) the outcome of
the game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 is a sequence of elements of the set {(φ1(u˜(k)), . . . , φM(u˜(k))) ∈
Υ: η(k) ≥ φ(u˜(k)), u˜(k) ∈ Ω, k = 1, 2, . . .} where the function
φ(u˜(k)) 7−→ Πi∈N(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k))) (4-3)
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is maximized at time step k. Note that in (4-3) the terms of the Nash product were inverted,
this is motivated by the fact that in a DMPC game the maximum utility of subsystem i is
achieved when the value of the local cost function φi(u˜(k)) is minimal.
Until here, the symmetric DMPC game and its outcome were defined. Now, it must be
demonstrated that the solution of {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 given by (4-3) is the symmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution of such a game. With this purpose, it is required to demonstrate that (4-3)
satisfies Axioms 1-4 at a fixed time k, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞.
Let us begin with Proposition 2. This proposition is required for:
• Proving that the outcome of the game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 given by (4-3) is the symmetric
Nash bargaining solution of such a game.
• Establishing that the corresponding optimization problem is well-posed.
Proposition 2 The solution ϕ(Υ, η(k)) of the game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 at time step k is unique
if Υ and φ(u˜(k)) are both convex 
Proof 4 For the complete proof of Proposition 2 see Section B.1 
Recall that the DMPC problem is originally a minimization problem. Then, let us redefine
the weakly Pareto optimal subset of T as
W ′(T ) := {α ∈ T : there is no β ∈ T with β < α}
Let Ψ: = {φi(u˜(k)) ∈ Υ: η(k) ≥ φ(u˜(k)), u˜(k) ∈ Ω, i ∈ N}. As a consequence of Proposi-
tion 2, Propositions 3 and 4 arise.
Proposition 3 The bargaining solution ϕ(Υ, η(k)) of the game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 at time step
k belongs to W ′(Ψ) 
Proof 5 For the complete proof of Proposition 3 see Section B.2 
Proposition 4 Let {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 and {(Υ′, η′(k))}∞k=0 be a pair of DMPC games such that
Υ′ ⊂ Υ. Let η′(k) = η(k), and ϕ(Υ, η(k)) ∈ Υ′ at k. Then ϕ(Υ, η(k)) = ϕ(Υ′, η′(k)) 
Proof 6 For the complete proof of Proposition 4 see Section B.3 
From Proposition 4 following the procedure proposed in (Peters, 1992), based on the Minkowski
separation theorem (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004; Karlin, 1992; Rockafellar, 1970), and
by the quasiconcavity of (4-3) it is possible to conclude that the solution ϕ(Υ, η(k)) of
{(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 has the following features:
• If η(k) = η(k + 1) and x(k) = x(k + 1), then ϕ(Υ, η(k)) = ϕ(Υ, η(k + 1)) (ϕ(Υ, η(k))
remains constant at k + 1).
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• There exists a geometrical characterization for ϕ(Υ, η(k)).
• ϕ(Υ, η(k)) is well-posed.
Moreover, the geometrical characterization of ϕ(Υ, η(k)) and Proposition 3 allows to rewrite
Lemma 1 as it is shown in Lemma 3 whose consequence is Proposition 5.
Lemma 3 Consider a DMPC game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0. Let γ(k) ∈ W ′(Ψ). Then γ(k) =
ϕ(Υ, η(k)) if and only if
∑
i∈N
φi(u˜(k))
ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k)) =
∑
i∈N
γi(k)
ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k))
supports Υ at γ(k) at time step k 
Proof 7 See (Peters, 1992) 
Proposition 5 Consider the DMPC game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0. ∀a, b ∈ RM with a ≥ 0, the
bargaining solution of the game (aΥ + b, aη(k) + b) at k is equal to aϕ(Υ, η(k)) + b, i.e
ϕ(aΥ+ b, aη(k) + b) = aϕ(Υ, η(k)) + b 
Proof 8 For the complete proof of Proposition 5 see Section B.4 
Finally, by the symmetry of {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 we have:
Proposition 6 A symmetric DMPC game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 satisfies ϕi(Υ, η(k)) = ϕj(Υ, η(k)),
∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ N at time step k 
Proof 9 For the compete proof of Proposition 6 see Section B.4 
Propositions 3-6 imply the following theorem:
Theorem 1 For a DMPC game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0, the solution {ϕ(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 defined by (4-
3) at time step k is the Nash bargaining solution of such a game 
Proof 10 From Propositions 3-6 the bargaining solution ϕ(Υ, η(k)) of the DMPC game
{(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 satisfies Axioms 1-4 at time step k. Then ϕ(Υ, η(k)) is the Nash bargaining
solution of the DMPC game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 for such time step 
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Summarizing, the properties of {ϕ(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 defined (at time step k) by (4-3) are given
by
• Theorem 1.
• Proposition 2.
• Lemma 3.
• The geometrical characterization of ϕ(Υ, η(k)).
Note that if the symmetry of {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 remains for k = 1, 2, . . . these properties
are satisfied at each time step, characterizing the trajectory described by the sequence
{ϕ(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0. Furthermore, from (4-3) this each element of {ϕ(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 can be com-
puted as a solution of the maximization problem
max
u˜(k)
Πi∈N(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k)))
subject to: η(k) > φ(u˜(k))
u˜(k) ∈ Ω
(4-4)
which has the same solution of (4-5).
max
u˜(k)
M∑
i=1
log(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k)))
subject to: η(k) > φ(u˜(k))
u˜(k) ∈ Ω
(4-5)
Let σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) = φi(u˜(k)) for i = 1, . . . ,M , where u˜−i(k) denotes the control actions
of the remaining subsystems, i.e., u˜−i(k) = [u˜
T
1 (k), . . . , u˜
T
i−1(k), u˜
T
i+1(k), . . . , u˜
T
M(k)] (the re-
definition of φi(u˜(k)) is done in order to distinguish the local control actions from the control
actions of the remaining subsystems). Then, maximization problem (4-5) can be solved in a
distributed way by locally solving the systemwide control problem (4-6).
max
u˜i(k)
M∑
r=1
log(ηr(k)− σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)))
Subject to:
ηr(k) > σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))
u˜i(k) ∈ Ωi
(4-6)
Maximization problem (4-6) is equivalent to maximization problem (4-5), considering fixed
u˜−i(k) and optimizing only in the direction of u˜i(k).
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This formulation allows each subsystem:
• To take into account the effect of its decisions in the behavior of the remaining
subsystems.
• To take into account the effect of the local decisions in the utility of the remain-
ing subsystems and in their decision about to cooperate or not (see Section 4.5 for
details).
• Combined with the negotiation model, to decide whether to cooperate or not de-
pending on the utility perceived by the cooperative behavior (see Section 4.5 for
details).
These aspects reflect the paradigm underlying the proposed control scheme: Focussing
on others
The convexity and feasibility of optimization problem (4-6) are analyzed in (F. Valencia
et al., 2010). In Section 4.5 the algorithm for implementing (4-6) is presented. In the next
Section the DMPC problem is analyzed as a non-symmetric bargaining game. This is a
more general case of DMPC problems than the symmetric case presented in this section (the
symmetry conditions stated in this Subsection are not considered).
4.4.3. Non-Symmetric Game
In Subsection 4.3 conditions for the symmetry of discrete-time dynamic bargaining games
were presented. These conditions established that a discrete-time dynamic bargaining game
{(Θ(k), η(k))}∞k=0 is symmetric if it satisfies the following requirements:
• η1(k) = . . . = ηM(k) for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞.
• For every φ(k) ∈ Θ(k), any point φ˜(k) ∈ RM arising from φ(k) by performing some
permutation of its coordinates is also inside Θ(k) for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞.
Such conditions are satisfied when the following statements are satisfied:
• fi(x(k), u(k)) = fj(x(k), u(k)).
• gi(x(k), u(k)) = gj(x(k), u(k)).
• hi(x(k), u(k)) = hj(x(k), u(k)).
• Xi = Xj for all i, j ∈ N .
• Ui = Uj for all i, j ∈ N
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From the symmetry conditions, it is possible to conclude that (naturally) the DMPC problem
arising from the distributed control of homogeneous systems is an example of symmetric
discrete-time dynamic bargaining game. Here the expression homogeneous systems refers
to those systems composed by several subsystems with the same characteristic, like the
quadruple tank process.
Although there exists several real systems satisfying the symmetry conditions of discrete-
time dynamic bargaining games, these conditions are heavily restrictive, mainly because
real large-scale systems are composed by several different subsystems with different time
evolution equations. Then, in general a DMPC game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 is non-symmetric and a
characterization for the outcome of non-symmetric DMPC games should be derived by means
of the definitions and properties of the non-symmetric discrete-time dynamic bargaining
games.
Let us redefine Pareto optimal subset of T as P (T ) := {α ∈ T : there is no β ∈ T with β 6
α, β 6= α}. Also let us redefine the set L+(T, γ) := {i ∈ L : there exists α ∈ T with αi < γi}.
Moreover, Axiom 5 should be rewritten as follows:
Axiom 7 DMPC Individual Rationality:
For every bargaining game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 the outcome of the game {ϕ(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 satisfies
the inequality ϕ(Υ, η(k)) < η(k) for k = 1, 2, . . . ,∞ 
Based on these modifications to the original theory, the outcome of a game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0
with weighted hierarchy ℏ is a sequence {ϕℏ(Υ, η(0)), ϕℏ(Υ, η(1)), ϕℏ(Υ, η(2)) . . .} denoted by
{ϕℏ(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0, where (for a fixed k) ϕℏ(Υ, η(k)) is given by the lexicographic maximization
of the Nash products over the sets
Υ0(k) := {φ(u˜(k)) ∈ RM : φ(u˜(k)) ∈ P (Υ), φ(u˜(k)) 6 η(k)}
Υ1(k) := argmax{Π(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k)))wi : i ∈ N1, φ(u˜(k)) ∈ Υ0(k)}
Υ2(k) :=

argmax{Π(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k)))wi : i ∈ N2+(Υ1(k), η(k)), φ(u˜(k)) ∈ Υ0(k)}
if N2+(Υ
1(k), η(k)) 6= ∅
Θ1 otherwise
...
Υm(k) :=

argmax{Π(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k)))wi : i ∈ Nm+ (Υm−1(k), η(k)), φ(u˜(k)) ∈ Υm−1(k)}
if Nm+ (Υ
m−1(k), η(k)) 6= ∅
Υm−1 otherwise
(4-7)
whereN l+(Υ
l−1(k), η(k)) := {i ∈ N l : there exists φ(u˜(k)) ∈ Υl−1 with φi(u˜(k)) < ηi(k)}, l =
1, . . . , m.
Although the definition of weighted hierarchy requires the selection of the weights for each
subsystem, there are not guidelines for choosing their values. In the control theory field, the
values of the weights can be arbitrarily selected as wi =
1
M
, i = 1, . . . ,M (such a selection is
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made in (Doan et al., 2008; Aswin N. Venkat et al., 2006; Venkat et al., 2006b,a)). However,
performing controllability and/or sensitivity analysis can help to derive guidelines for the
selection of the weights wi. Also, the prior knowledge of the system can be used to select
the weights.
Note that for a DMPC game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0, ℏ = (N,w). Then, from the lexicographic
solution (4-7), the non-symmetric bargaining solution of a DMPC game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 at
time step k can be computed in a centralized way as a solution of the maximization problem
(4-8). This solution has the same properties as the solution given by (4-4) (except for such
properties related with Axiom 1), and it also satisfies Axioms 6 and 7. Moreover, from
(Peters, 1992) if wi = wj =
1
M
, ∀i, j ∈ N the solution of (4-8) is the same that the solution
of (4-4), i.e., the solution of the non-symmetric DMPC game is the same that the solution
of the symmetric DMPC and has the same properties (including also symmetry).
max
u˜(k)
ΠMi=1(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k)))wi
Subject to:
ηi(k) > φi(u˜(k))
u˜(k) ∈ Ω
(4-8)
Based on the fact that the solution of (4-8) is the same that the solution of (4-4) whether
wi = wj =
1
M
, ∀i, j ∈ N , the proposed negotiation model can be used for both symmetric
and non-symmetric DMPC games (see Section 4.5 for more details about the proposed
negotiation model).
The maximization problem (4-8) can be written equivalently as (4-9).
max
u˜(k)
M∑
i=1
wi log(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k)))
Subject to:
ηi(k) > φi(u˜(k))
u˜(k) ∈ Ω
(4-9)
Then, the maximization problem (4-8) can be solved in a distributed way by locally solving
the systemwide control problem (4-10).
max
u˜i(k)
M∑
r=1
wr log(ηr(k)− σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)))
Subject to:
ηr(k) > σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))
u˜i(k) ∈ Ωi
(4-10)
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Note that maximization problem (4-10) is equivalent to maximization problem (4-9), con-
sidering fixed u˜−i(k) and optimizing only in the direction of u˜i(k).
This formulation (as in the symmetric case) allows each subsystem:
• To take into account the effect of its decisions in the behavior of the remaining
subsystems.
• To take into account the effect of the local decisions in the utility of the remain-
ing subsystems and in their decision about to cooperate or not (see Section 4.5 for
details).
• Combined with the negotiation model, to decide whether to cooperate or not de-
pending on the utility perceived by the cooperative behavior (see Section 4.5 for
details).
These aspects (as in the symmetric case) reflect the paradigm underlying the proposed
control scheme: Focussing on others
The convexity and feasibility of (4-10) are addressed in (F. Valencia et al., 2010). In the
next Section, the proposed negotiation model for implementing a distributed solution of
symmetric and non-symmetric DMPC games is presented.
4.5. Negotiation Model
A negotiation model is a sequence of steps for computing the outcome of a game. In the
literature several negotiation models have been proposed for solving n-person games, almost
all of them based on the coalition formation and often the proposed negotiation models
solve the games in a centralized way (see (Akira, 2005) and the references therein for more
complete information). In the case of the DMPC game, the proposed algorithm solves such
games in a distributed way.
4.5.1. The Model
The negotiation model proposed to solve DMPC games {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 in a distributed way
is based on the negotiation model model proposed by Nash (1953) for two-person games.
Such model has the following steps:
1. Each player choose an strategy which it will be forced to use if they cannot come to
an agreement, i.e., if they demands are incompatible. This strategy is called the treat.
2. The players inform each other of their treats.
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3. Each player decides upon his demand. The idea is that player i does not cooperate
unless the cooperation gives to him at least its demanded utility.
4. The utilities of the payers are determined: if the demands are simultaneously satisfied,
then each player gets what he demanded. Otherwise, the treats are executed and they
finally determine the utility of each player.
These steps represent a two move game where steps two and four do not involve any decision
(an in depth description of the previous model can be found in (Nash, 1953)).
The proposed steps to solve the DMPC game are:
1. At time step k, each subsystem sends to the remaining subsystems the values of
xi(k), ηi(k).
2. With the information received, each subsystem solves the local optimization problem
max
u˜i(k)
M∑
r=1
wr log(ηr(k)− σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)))
Subject to:
ηr(k) > σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)), r = 1, . . . ,M
u˜i(k) ∈ Ωi
(4-11)
3. Let u˜∗i (k) denote optimal control actions for subsystem i, i = 1, . . . ,M . If (4-11)
is feasible, subsystem i selects the first control action of u˜∗i (k) as a control action.
Otherwise, subsystem i selects the first control action of u˜i(k), where u˜i(k) is the
initial condition of subsystem i at time step k for solving (4-11).
4. Each subsystem updates its disagreement point. If (4-11) is feasible the update of the
disagreement point of subsystem i is given by η(k+1) = ηi(k)−α(ηi(k)−φi(u˜(k))).
Otherwise, the update of the disagreement point of subsystem i is given by η(k+1) =
ηi(k) + (φi(u˜(k))− ηi(k)).
5. Each subsystem sends its updated control action and its updated disagreement point.
6. Go to step 1.
The initial condition for solving (4-11) at time step k + 1 are given by the shifted control
input u˜oi(k + 1) = [u
∗T
i (k + 1), . . . , u
∗T
i (k + Np), 0], where the superscript ∗ denotes the
optimal value of the control input.
As in the case of the negotiation model proposed by Nash (1953), the negotiation model to
solve the DMPC game in a distributed way represents a two moves game where the decisions
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are taken in steps 3 and 4. In this negotiation model:
• Each subsystem is fully informed on the structure of the game.
• Each subsystem is fully informed on the utility function of the remaining subsystems.
• Each subsystem is assumed intelligent (intelligence is given by the optimization pro-
cedure).
• Each subsystem is assumed rational (rationality is given by the decision procedure).
Hence, although the situation described by the DMPC game involves (normally) more than
2 players (subsystems), such situation also satisfies all assumptions made by Nash (1953) in
order to propose his negotiation model.
Based on the fact that:
• The solution of a DMPC game given by (4-4) or by (4-8) is the Nash bargaining
solution (at time step k) of {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0.
• The negotiation model proposed in this work to solve a DMPC game reduces the
bargaining situation to a non-cooperative situation with two moves to compute the
solution of {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0, as in (Nash, 1953).
• The negotiation model proposed in this work to solve a DMPC game satisfies all
assumptions made by Nash (1953) in order to propose his negotiation model.
• The DMPC game involves (normally) more than 2 players (subsystems).
The negotiation model presented in this work can be considered as an extension to n-
persons discrete-time dynamic bargaining games of the model proposed by Nash (1953).
Note that
• The negotiation model presented only considers the non-symmetric case.
• It seems that in the negotiation model there is not a negotiation process
However,
• Assuming the same value for the weight wi for all subsystems, i.e., wi = 1M , ∀i ∈ N
the solution of (4-11) corresponds to the solution of the symmetric DMPC game; or
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replacing (4-11) by
max
u˜i(k)
M∑
r=1
log(ηr(k)− σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)))
Subject to:
ηr(k) > σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)), r = 1, . . . ,M
u˜i(k) ∈ Ωi
a distributed solution for symmetric DMPC games can be implemented.
• The cost function
J(u˜(k)) =
M∑
r=1
wr log(ηr(k)− σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)))
allows every subsystem to have certain degree of coordination with the remaining
subsystems. Thus, subsystem i is able to compute its optimal control inputs in a
separated way from the information provided by the remaining subsystems.
Furthermore, since each subsystem made its own decision in a separated way the proposed
algorithm does not require an iterative process for computing the local control actions. This
also allows to decrease the computational burden in the solution of the DMPC problem.
This is the main difference of the proposed control scheme with respect to the approaches
based on Lagrange multipliers. In addition, using the definition of weighted hierarchy it is
possible to analyze hierarchical MPC schemes as a bargaining game.
Hence,
• The mathematical framework given by the discrete-time bargaining games provides
a general framework to formulate MPC based schemes for the control of large-scale
systems (hierarchical MPC based schemes were not included in this work because is
beyond of its scope).
• Since the bargaining process is formulated on the basis of how much each subsystem
provides to the entire system performance, and not in the concept of how each subsys-
tem has to react against the decisions of the other subsystems, discrete-time dynamic
bargaining games provide an alternative paradigm to analyze and to formulate MPC
based schemes to control large-scale systems.
In addition, although the formulation presented in this work comes from a special case in
which the centralized cost function can be expressed as the sum of all local cost functions,
this is not a requirement for the bargaining process. Only local functions that depend from
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decisions of the other subsystems are required. This makes more flexible the bargaining
approach to the DMPC problem than almost all the DMPC schemes presented in the liter-
ature.
Moreover, most of the DMPC schemes based on game theory require to perform two or more
optimizations. These optimizations are focused on computing the local control actions of
each subsystem and on suggesting to the other subsystems which control actions use, and/or
on creating a matrix of costs used for each subsystem to select which control action apply
(see (Trodden et al., 2009; Mun˜oz et al., 2009) for examples of these kind of approaches).
However,
In the proposed negotiation model only one optimization problem should be solved. This
allows to reduce the computational burden of the DMPC scheme associated with the com-
munications among subsystems and maybe with the solution of more than one optimization
problem at each time step.
In next Section the closed-loop stability of a system where the control inputs are computed
with the proposed control scheme is discussed.
4.5.2. Closed-Loop Stability
From the algorithm presented in Section 4.5.1, the stability of the proposed DMPC method
depends on the decision of each subsystem about to cooperate or to not. Thus, in order to
demonstrate the stability of the closed-loop system, two cases were considered:
1. All subsystems always cooperate.
2. Some subsystems do not cooperate but few time steps ahead they all start to cooperate
In this thesis the case where all subsystems decide not to cooperate is not considered because
by the definition of the disagreement point presented in Section 4.4 this situation happens
only if φi(u˜(k) → ∞ as k → ∞. Recall that for non-cooperating subsystems ηi(k + 1) =
ηi(k) + (φi(u˜(k))− ηi(k)) = φi(u˜(k)).
Let C(k) ⊂ N denote the partition of N determined by the subsystems to cooperate at time
step k. Let C˜(k) denote the partition of N determined by the subsystems not to cooperate
at time step k. Recall that L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) denotes the global cost function of the system given
by
L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) =
M∑
i=1
φi(u˜(k))
Also, recall that σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) = φi(u˜(k)). Then, L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) can be written as
L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) =
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))
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From (Venkat et al., 2006a), if u˜∗i (k) = λiu¯i(k) + (1 − λi)u˜i(k − 1), 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1, with u¯i(k)
the sequence of optimal control actions at time step k, then
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k), u˜
∗
−i(k)) ≤
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) (4-12)
where the equality is obtained if u˜∗i (k) = u˜(k − 1). In the proposed control scheme u∗i (k) =
λiu¯i(k)+(1−λi)u˜i(k−1), λi = 1 for the cooperating subsystems, and u∗i (k) = λiu¯i(k)+(1−
λi)u˜i(k − 1), λi = 0 for the non-cooperating subsystems. Then, according to this update of
the control actions∑
i∈C(k)
σi(u˜
∗
i (k), u˜
∗
−i(k)) <
∑
i∈C(k)
σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))∑
i∈C˜(k)
σi(u˜
∗
i (k), u˜
∗
−i(k)) =
∑
i∈C˜(k)
σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))
Hence, the proposed algorithm also satisfies (4-12) independently of the decisions of the
subsystems, where the equality is obtained if C˜(k) = N . Furthermore, from the proposed
negotiation model
∑
i∈C(k) σi(u˜
∗
i (k), u˜
∗
−i(k)) <
∑
i∈C(k) ηi(k) then
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k), u˜
∗
−i(k)) ≤
∑
i∈C(k)
ηi(k) +
∑
i∈C˜(k)
σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) (4-13)
where the equality only is obtained if C˜(k) = N .
At time step k + 1 the initial value of the global cost function is given by
L(x˜(k + 1), u˜(k + 1)) =
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k), u˜
∗
−i(k))
From (4-12)
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k + 1), u˜
∗
−i(k + 1)) ≤
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k), u˜
∗
−i(k))
and from (4-13)
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k + 1), u˜
∗
−i(k + 1)) ≤
∑
i∈C(k+1)
ηi(k + 1) +
∑
i∈C˜(k+1)
σi(u˜i(k + 1), u˜−i(k + 1))
with∑
i∈C(k+1)
ηi(k + 1) +
∑
i∈C˜(k+1)
σi(u˜i(k + 1), u˜−i(k + 1)) ≤
∑
i∈C(k)
ηi(k) +
∑
i∈C˜(k)
σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))
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where the equality is obtained if C˜(k + 1) = C˜(k) = N . As a consequence
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k + 1), u˜
∗
−i(k + 1))−
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k + 1), u˜
∗
−i(k + 1)) ≤M(k)
where M(k) ≤ 0 defined as
M(k) =
∑
i∈C(k+1)
ηi(k + 1)−
∑
i∈C(k)
ηi(k)
+
∑
i∈C˜(k+1)
σi(u˜i(k + 1), u˜−i(k + 1))−
∑
i∈C˜(k)
σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))
Since L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) =
∑M
i=1 σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) satisfies
1. L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) 6= 0, ∀(x˜(k), u˜(k)) 6= (0, 0).
2. L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) = 0 for (x˜(k), u˜(k)) = (0, 0).
3. L(x˜(k + 1), u˜(k + 1))− L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) ≤M(k), ∀k.
with M(k) a nonincreasing function of k the states of the closed-loop system converge to a
neighborhood of the origin. Hence, the system is stable. Since the convergence of M(k) to
the origin cannot be demonstrated the asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system cannot
be assured in the general case.
An special case consist of the scenario in which all subsystems always decide to cooperate,
i.e., C(k) = N, ∀k. In this case
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k), u˜
∗
−i(k)) <
M∑
i=1
ηi(k)
M∑
i=1
ηi(k + 1) <
M∑
i=1
ηi(k)
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k + 1), u˜
∗
−i(k + 1)) <
M∑
i=1
ηi(k + 1)
Hence
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k + 1), u˜
∗
−i(k + 1)) <
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k), u˜
∗
−i(k)) (4-14)
Therefore
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k+1), u˜
∗
−i(k+1))−
M∑
i=1
σi(u˜
∗
i (k), u˜
∗
−i(k)) ≤ −α
M∑
i=1
ηi(k)−σi(u˜∗i (k), u˜∗−i(k)) (4-15)
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with ηi(k)− σi(u˜∗i (k), u˜∗−i(k)) > 0, ∀i, ∀k. Since L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) =
∑M
i=1 σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))
L(x˜(k + 1), u˜(k + 1))− L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) ≤ −α
M∑
i=1
ηi(k)− σi(u˜∗i (k), u˜∗−i(k))
Recall that L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) is a quadratic positive convex function satisfying:
• L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) 6= 0, ∀(x˜(k), u˜(k)) 6= (0, 0).
• L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) = 0 for (x˜(k), u˜(k)) = (0, 0).
Let Mc(k) = α
∑M
i=1 ηi(k)− σi(u˜∗i (k), u˜∗−i(k)). Then,
• From (4-15) L(x˜(k + 1), u˜(k + 1))− L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) ≤ −Mc(k).
• From (4-10) and from the negotiation model ηi(k) > σi(u˜∗i (k), u˜∗−i(k)), ∀i ∈ C(k).
Hence,
• Mc(k) > 0, ∀k.
• L(x˜(k + 1), u˜(k + 1))− L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) is a decreasing function of k, bounded below by
0.
Therefore, L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) satisfies the conditions of a Lyapunov function and validates the
asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system when the subsystems always decide to co-
operate.
4.6. Summary
In this chapter, a bargaining approach to the distributed model predictive control problem
was proposed. Such approach is based on the axiomatic theory proposed by Nash (1953)
for two-person bargaining games, and extended by Harsanyi (1963) to n-person bargaining
games. The selection of the bargaining approach was motivated by the fact that the bar-
gaining process associated with the distributed model predictive control is formulated on
the basis of how much each subsystem provides to the whole system performance, and not
in the concept of how each subsystem has to react against the decisions of the remaining
subsystems. This provides a new paradigm to design distributed model predictive control
schemes.
Since the original axiomatic theory of bargaining games was formulated for static decision
environments, an extension of this theory was proposed (in this chapter) in order to formulate
the distributed model predictive control problem as a bargaining game. As a consequence of
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Symmetric DMPC game Non-symmetric DMPC game
The disagreement points are the same The disagreement points are not the same
for all subsystems, for all time steps. for all subsystems, for all time steps.
Any cost φ˜(u˜(k)) arising by a permutation Any cost φ˜(u˜(k)) arising by a permutation
of the coordinates of a feasible cost function of the coordinates of a feasible cost function
φ(u˜(k)), belongs to the feasible set of cost φ(u˜(k)), not necessarily belongs to the
functions Υ. feasible set of cost functions Υ.
The functions determining the dynamic The functions determining the dynamic
evolution of the decision space and the evolution of the decision space and the
disagreement point are the same for all disagreement point are not necessarily
subsystems. the same for all subsystems.
The feasible sets for the states and the The feasible sets for the states and the
inputs are the same for all subsystems. inputs are not necessarily the same for
all subsystems
Table 4-1.: Main characteristics of symmetric and non-symmetric distributed model predict-
ive control games
this extension the concept of discrete-time dynamic bargaining game arose. Such a concept
allowed to analyze and to identify symmetric and non-symmetric situations in the distributed
model predictive control problem. Thus, conditions for symmetry and non-symmetry (in
the sense of discrete-time dynamic bargaining games) were derived for the distributed model
predictive control problem when it is analyzed as a bargaining game. Moreover, for both
conditions (symmetric and non-symmetric) properties to characterize the outcome of the
distributed model predictive control game were established (see Appendix B for the details
of the demonstrations). Table 4.6 presents the main characteristics of symmetric and non-
symmetric distributed model predictive control games.
However, the bargaining approach to the distributed model predictive control problem
presented in this thesis is not the only approach based on game theory reported in the
literature. In the literature there are several approaches based on game theory to the dis-
tributed model predictive control problem. In Table 4.6 the advantages and disadvantages
of some of them are highlighted. From this table it is possible to conclude that game theory
based distributed model predictive control schemes has two main drawbacks:
1. The convergence to a Nash equilibrium point of the non-cooperative game based ap-
proaches.
2. The solution (by each subsystem) of more than one optimization problem at each time
step in the cooperative game based approaches.
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References Advantages Disadvantages
(Du et al., 2001) DMPC as a Convergence to
(Li et al., 2005) non-cooperative a Nash
game equilibrium point
(Giovanini and Balderud, 2006) Convergence and Convergence to a Nash
(Trodden et al., 2009) feasibility equilibrium point; more
conditions established than one optimization
at each time step
(Mun˜oz et al., 2009) Cooperative Building of tables
(J. M. Maestre et al., 2011) game approach of payments; more
(J.M. Maestre et al., 2011) than one optimization
(C. Portilla et al., 2012b) at each time step
Table 4-2.: Advantages and disadvantages of the reviewed game theory based DMPC
schemes
In order to tackle these drawbacks, a negotiation model with two moves was proposed in
this chapter based on the negotiation model proposed by Nash (1953) for two-person games.
In the proposed negotiation model
• The bargaining situation is reduced to a two moves non-cooperative situation (a situ-
ation where there are two stages in which each subsystem makes its own decision in a
separated way).
• The negotiation mechanism is determined by the capability of each subsystem to de-
termine the effect of its decisions in the utility (or performance) of the remaining
subsystems, and decide which local control action should be applied, by using a sys-
temwide cost function as a local cost.
As a consequence of these features, each subsystem only has to solve one optimization prob-
lem. Moreover, since bargaining games belong to cooperative games the solution computed
by the proposed negotiation model belongs to the Pareto set of the set of feasible values of
the cost function. Then, the convergence to Nash equilibrium points is avoided. In Chapter 5
two examples are used to illustrate the theory presented in the current chapter.
5. Illustrative Examples
5.1. Introduction
In this Chapter, the theoretical results presented in Chapter 4 are illustrated by using two
widely known systems in the control field: the quadruple tank process (also known as the
four tank system), and a chain of two reactors followed by a flash separator. In Section 5.2
the motivation for the selection of these examples is discussed. In Section 5.3 the symmetry
conditions of the DMPC problem are illustrated using the quadruple tank process. Sec-
tion 5.4 deals with the analysis of the non-symmetry conditions of the DMPC problem by
means of the chain of reactors followed by a flash separator. In both sections (Section 5.3 and
Section 5.4), the description of the system, the bargaining formulation of the DMPC prob-
lem, and the simulation results are presented. Finally, Section 5.5 deals with the summary
of the chapter.
5.2. Motivation
From the formulation of the DMPC problem as a discrete-time dynamic bargaining game
presented in Chapter 4, two situations arose:
1. The symmetric situation where the subsystems have the same characteristics, then the
profit perceived for all of them and their minimum expected performance (disagreement
point) is the same for all time steps k.
2. The non-symmetric situation where the subsystems are different to each other, then
their profits and disagreement points can be different.
In Chapter 3 both situations were characterized and as a conclusion the non-symmetric
situation is more frequent in real applications than the symmetric situation. However, both
can happen. Hence, In this chapter an example to illustrate when a DMPC problem becomes
symmetric and an example to illustrate when a DMPC problem becomes non-symmetric
discrete-time dynamic bargaining game are presented.
In order to present the symmetric DMPC game, the widely known quadruple tank process
is used. In this case, it is assumed that all the tanks have the same characteristics. With
the purpose to present a situation where the DMPC problem can be formulated as a non-
symmetric bargaining game a chain of two continuous stirred tank reactors (CSTR) followed
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by a flash separator is used. In both cases a brief description of the process is presented
followed by the steps to formulate the DMPC problem as a bargaining game.
The selection of these cases of study was motivated by the widely use of these systems in
the test of DMPC schemes ((I. Alvarado et al., 2010; Venkat et al., 2006a) for examples),
and because these systems are sufficiently illustrative to present the concepts introduced in
Chapter 4, and interesting from the point of view of the control theory due to the coupling
among their dynamics and their nonlinearities.
5.3. Symmetric Game
In order to present a situation where a DMPC game becomes symmetric, the quadruple tank
system was used as a testbed. In this case, it was assumed that
• The tanks of the system had the same characteristics: height, cross area, and outlet
hole diameter.
• The valves used to divide the flow of water feeding the tanks have the same split ratio.
A more detailed description of the process is presented in Subsections below.
5.3.1. Description of the System
The four-tank process is a laboratory plant that has been designed to test control techniques
using industrial instrumentation and control systems. The plant is a hydraulic process
of four interconnected tanks inspired by the educational quadruple-tank process proposed
by (Johansson et al., 2000). The process constitutes a simple multivariable system with
highly coupled nonlinear dynamics that can exhibit transmission zero dynamics. The control
objective is to regulate the levels of the lower tanks to their desired values, by manipulating
the flows feeding the tanks. Figure 5-1 shows an schematic diagram of the quadruple tank
process.
From first, a model given by (5-1)-(5-4) was derived (Johansson et al., 2000). In this model
hi(t), Ai and ai with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} refer to the level, cross section and the discharge constant
of i-th tank, respectively; qj(t) and γj with j ∈ {a, b} denote the flow and the ratio of the
three-way valve of j-th pump, respectively; and g is the gravitational acceleration. The
values of the parameters of the system used for the simulations are shown in Table 5-1.
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Figure 5-1.: Schematic diagram of the quadruple tank system (Johansson et al., 2000). The
purpose of this system is to regulate the level at the lower tanks by modifying
the feeding flows of the tanks.
dh1(t)
dt
= − a1
A1
√
2gh1(t) +
a3
A1
√
2gh3(t) +
γa
A1
qa(t) (5-1)
dh2(t)
dt
= − a2
A2
√
2gh2(t) +
a4
A2
√
2gh4(t) +
γb
A2
qb(t) (5-2)
dh3(t)
dt
= − a3
A3
√
2gh3(t) +
(1− γb)
A3
qb(t) (5-3)
dh4(t)
dt
= − a4
A4
√
2gh4(t) +
(1− γa)
A4
qa(t) (5-4)
In order to test the proposed DMPC scheme, a simulation experiment was defined, where
the control objective was to follow the changes in the reference values of tanks 1 and 2 by
manipulating the flows qa and qb. The changes made in the reference values followed the
sequence below:
1. The reference values of tanks 1 and 2 were set at h01 and h
0
2 respectively.
2. At 3000 s a 10% decrease (with respect to the equilibrium point) in the reference value
of the tank 1 and a 10% increase (with respect to the equilibrium point) in the reference
value of tank 2 were made.
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value unit description
hmax 1.36 m Maximum level in all cases
hmin 0.2 m Minimum level in all cases
qmax 3.26 m
3/h Maximum flow of qa and qb
qmin 0 m
3/h Minimum flow of qa and qb
a1, a2 1.31e-4 m
2 Discharge constant of the tanks
a3, a4
A1, A2 0.06 m
2 Cross-section of the tanks
A3, A4
γa, γb 0.3 Split ratio of the 3-way valve
of qa and qb
h01 0.6042 m Linearization level of tank 1
h02 0.6042 m Linearization level of tank 2
h03 0.296 m Linearization level of tank 3
h04 0.296 m Linearization level of tank 4
q0a, q
0
b 1.63 m
3/h Linearization flow of qa and qb
Ts 5 s Sample time
Table 5-1.: Values of the parameters of the system used in the simulations
3. At 6000s the reference values were returned to h01 and h
0
2 respectively.
4. At 9000s a 30% increase (with respect to the equilibrium point) in reference values of
thanks 1 and 2 were made.
The procedure to formulate the DMPC for the quadruple tank process as a symmetric DMPC
game is presented in the next section.
5.3.2. The Bargaining Game
From (5-1)-(5-4), the model of the quadruple tank process can be written as
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t))
y(t) = g(x(t), u(t))
(5-5)
where x(t) = [h1(t), h2(t), h3(t), h4(t)]
T is the state vector, y(t) = [h1(t), h2(t)]
T is the output
vector, u(t) = [qa(t), qb(t)]
T is the control input vector, and f(·), g(·) are the functions
relating the states and inputs with the evolution of the states and the evolution of the
outputs respectively.
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Let xi(t) = hi(t) − h0i (t), uj(t) = qj(t) − q0j denote the deviation variables, h0i (t), q0j being
the values of the levels and the control inputs at the equilibrium point. Then, linearizing the
model at an operating point given by the equilibrium levels and flows shown in Table 5-1
the following continuous-time linear model is obtained
dx(t)
dt
= Acx(t) +Bcu(t). (5-6)
y(t) = Cx(t)
where x(t) = [xT1 (t), . . . , x
T
4 (t)]
T , u(t) = [uT1 (t), u
T
2 (t)]
T , y(t) = [hT1 (t), h
T
2 (t)]
T , and
Ac =

−1
τ1
0 1
τ3
0
0 −1
τ2
0 1
τ4
0 0 −1
τ3
0
0 0 0 −1
τ4
 , Bc =

γa
A1
0
0 γb
A2
0 (1−γb)
A3
(1−γa)
A4
0
 , Cc =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
with τi =
Ai
ai
√
2h0i
g
≥ 0 being the time constant of tank i.
In the same way as in (I. Alvarado et al., 2010), here, the whole system is divided into two
coupled subsystems as follows: The subsystem 1 consists of tanks 1 and 3 while subsystem
2 consists of tanks 2 and 4. That is, subsystem 1 is characterized by the state x(t)1 =
[x1(t), x3(t)]
T and its output y1(t) is x1(t) while the states of subsystem 2 are x2(t) =
[x2(t), x4(t)]
T and its output y2(t) = x2(t). The continuous-time models of subsystems 1
and 2 are given by
dx1(t)
dt
= Ac1x1(t) +Bc1u(t) (5-7)
y1(t) = Cc1x1(t)
and by
dx2(t)
dt
= Ac2x2(t) +Bc2u(t) (5-8)
y2(t) = Cc2x2(t)
respectively, where Ac1, Bc1 , Cc1, Ac2, Bc2 and Cc2 comes from Ac, Bc, Cc. Note that the
subsystems considered are coupled only through the inputs. The corresponding discrete-time
model of each subsystem is derived from the previous ones by means of the Tustin method
with a sampling time of 5 s. These will be denoted as follows:
x1(k + 1) = Ad1x1(k) +Bd1u(k) (5-9)
y1(k) = Cd1x1(k)
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x2(k + 1) = Ad2x2(k) +Bd2u(k) (5-10)
y2(k) = Cd2x2(k)
For the design of the DMPC scheme, a local quadratic cost function
Li(x˜i(k), u˜i(k)) =
Np−1∑
t=0
[
xTi (k + t|k)Qixi(k + t|k)
]
+
Nu∑
t=0
[
uTi (k + t)Riui(k + t)
]
+ xTi (k +Np|k)Pixi(k +Np|k)
(5-11)
with i = 1, 2, is used to measure the performance of each subsystem. Then following the
procedure presented in Chapter 2 with the local models given by (5-9) and (5-10), the local
cost functions can be written as
φi(u˜(k)) = u˜
T (k)Quuiu˜(k) + 2x
T
i (k)Qxuiu˜(k) + x
T
i (k)Qxxixi(k) (5-12)
where Quui ≥ 0 is a positive semidefinite matrix.
Since the value of the local cost functions depends on the decisions of both subsystems,
the DMPC controller for the quadruple tank process has the following features:
• It can be analyzed as game Gtank := {N, {φi(u˜(k)}i∈N , {Ωi}i∈N}, with N = {1, 2}.
• Its subsystems have the same goal: to compute the optimal control inputs such that
the levels at the lower tanks are regulated at their desired values.
• Assuming that the subsystems are able to communicate to each other, then it can
be analyzed as a bargaining game.
• From (5-9), (5-10), and (5-12) Ad1 = Ad2, Bd1 = Bd2. As a consequence Quu1 =
Quu2, Qxu1 = Qxu2, Qxx1 = Qxx2.
Hence, the game Gtank is a symmetric DMPC game if x
T
1 (k)x1(k) = x
T
2 (k)x2(k) for all
time steps k.
Below, the simulation results are presented.
5.3.3. Simulation Results and Discussion
Figure 5-2 shows the behavior of the levels of the tanks when the control actions are com-
puted as the solution of a symmetric DMPC game. The levels of tanks 1 and 2 are regulated
to the desired values despite of the changes on the set points, satisfying the control objective
proposed for this experiment. In order to regulate the levels of the tanks 1 and 2, the flows
qa and qb must were modified according to the system requirements. Figure 5-3 shows the
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Figure 5-2.: Evolution of the levels of the tanks when the control actions are computed as a
solution of a DMPC game. (top) behavior of the level of the tank 1. (middle)
behavior of the level of the tank 2. (bottom) behavior of the levels of the tanks
3 and 4. As it was expected the levels of tanks 1 and 2 were regulated to the
desired values instead of the changes on the set points while the levels of tanks
3 and 4 remains inside their feasible values.
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Figure 5-3.: Evolution of the control actions, disagreement points, and value of the cost
function of each subsystem. Although qa(k) and qb(k) had different values the
symmetry of the game remained under the conditions stated for the experiment.
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evolution of the control inputs, the disagreement point, and the value of the cost function
of each subsystem.
From Figure 5-3:
• Despite of the changes of the set points the control inputs remained feasible and
constant until the next change in the set point. This validates the uniqueness of the
solution of the symmetric DMPC game.
• Since both control actions qa and qb were feasible and the feasible set of each sub-
system was the same the control inputs could be permuted. Thus, the resulting cost
functions belonged to Υ.
• The behavior of the disagreement points of both subsystems and their cost functions
were the same (de differences are due to numerical rounding in the computations).
Then, the symmetry of the DMPC game associated to the four tank system was validated
under the conditions presented in Chapter 4.
5.4. Non-Symmetric Game
In order to illustrate the application of the theory presented in Chapter 4 (in particular
the theory of non-symmetric DMPC games) a process consisting on a chain of two reactors
connected in series followed by a flash separator was used as a case of study. This example
was taken from (Venkat et al., 2006a). An in depth description of the case of study is
presented in the next Subsections.
5.4.1. Description of the System
Consider a plant with two continuous stirred-tank reactors (CSTRs) followed by a nonadia-
batic flash separator, as shown in Figure 5-4. In each of the CSTRs, the desired product
B is produced through the irreversible first-order reaction A
k1−→ B, k1 being the Arrhenius
constant of the reaction. An undesirable side reaction B
k2−→ C results in the consumption of
B and in the production of the unwanted side product C (here, k2 is the Arrhenius constant
of this reaction). The product stream from CSTR-2 is sent to a nonadiabatic flash separator
to separate the excess of A from the product B and the side product C. In the flash separ-
ator, it is assumed that reactant A has the highest volatility and that it is the predominant
component in the vapor phase. A fraction of the vapor phase is purged and the remaining
stream rich in A is condensed and recycled back to CSTR-1.
In order to operate the system shown in Figure 5-4, the manipulated variables of the system
are the feed flow rates F0, F1, the cooling duties Qr, Qm, Qb, and the recycle flow rate D. The
measured variables are the level of liquid in the reactors Hr, Hm, Hb, the exit mass fractions
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HmHr
MPC1 MPC2
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A → B
B → C
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Fm,xAm,xBm,Tm
MPC3
FLASH
Figure 5-4.: Two reactor chain followed by nonadiabatic flash (Venkat et al., 2006a). In
this system the objective is to regulate the levels and the temperatures of each
device by modifying the input feeding flow and the cooling duties.
of A and B xAr, xBr, xAm, xBm, xAb, xBb, and the temperature of the reactors Tr, Tm, Tb. The
controlled variables are the levels of the reactors and the temperatures at the reactors and
at the flash separator.
With the purpose of designing a controller for the system shown in Figure 5-4, a model should
be derived. From the first principles of this system the evolution of the levels, concentrations,
and temperatures at each device of the process can be respectively modeled as follows (Venkat
et al., 2006a):
1. Reactor 1:
dHr
dt
=
1
ρrAr
[F0 +D − Fr]
dxAr
dt
=
1
ρrArHr
[F0(xA0 − xAr) +D(xAd − xAr)]− k1rxAr
dxBr
dt
=
1
ρrArHr
[F0(xB0 − xBr) +D(xBd − xBr)] + k1rxAr − k2rxBr
dTr
dt
=
1
ρrArHr
[F0(T0 − Tr) +D(Td − Tr)]− 1
Cp
[k1rxAr∆H1 + k2rxBr∆H2]
+
Qr
ρrArCpHr
(5-13)
2. Reactor 2:
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dHm
dt
=
1
ρmAm
[Fr + F1 − Fm]
dxAm
dt
=
1
ρmAmHm
[Fr(xAr − xAm) + F1(xA1 − xAm)]− k1mxAm
dxBm
dt
=
1
ρmAmHm
[Fr(xBr − xBm) + F1(xB1 − xBm)] + k1mxAm − k2mxBm
dTm
dt
=
1
ρmAmHm
[Fr(Tr − Tm) + F1(T0 − Tm)]− 1
Cp
[k1mxAm∆H1 + k2mxBm∆H2]
+
Qm
ρmAmCpHm
(5-14)
3. Nonadiabatic flash:
dHb
dt
=
1
ρbAb
[Fm − Fb −D − Fp]
dxAb
dt
=
1
ρbAbHb
[Fm(xAm − xAb)− (D + Fp)(xAd − xAb)]
dxBb
dt
=
1
ρbAbHb
[Fm(xBm − xBb) + (D + Fp)(xBd − xBb)]
dTb
dt
=
1
ρbAbHb
[Fm(Tm − Tb)] + Qb
ρbAbCpHb
(5-15)
where Fr = kr
√
Hr, Fm = km
√
Hm, Fb = kb
√
Hb, k1r = k
∗
1 exp
−E1
RTr , k2r = k
∗
2 exp
−E2
RTr , k1m =
k∗1 exp
−E1
RTm , k2m = k
∗
2 exp
−E2
RTm , xCr = 1−xAr−xBr, xCm = 1−xAm−xBm, xCb = 1−xAb−xBb,
Σ = αAxAb + αBxBb + αCxCb, xAd =
αAxAb
Σ
, xBd =
αBxBb
Σ
, xCd =
αCxCb
Σ
. The values of the
parameters of the system used for the simulations are shown in Tables 5-2 and 5-3 (Venkat
et al., 2006a). Moreover, the constraints of the system variables were: 0.9F0o 6 F0 6 1.1F0o,
0.96F1o 6 F1 6 1.04F1o for the feed flow rates of the CSTRs, 0.1Do 6 D 6 1.1Do for the
recycle flow rate, and −6 6 Qr 6 6, −6 6 Qm 6 6, −6 6 Qb 6 6 for the cooling duty of the
CSTRs and the adiabatic flash separator.
The performance of the proposed control scheme will be evaluated for a scenario in which:
1. A 15.79% increase in the level of Hm is made at t = 200s.
2. A set-point change corresponding to a 5.56% decrease in the level of Hr is made at
t = 400s.
Both changes were made keeping the remaining values of the set point fixed. For this
simulation experiment, it was considered a prediction horizon Np = 25, a control horizon
Nu = 10, and a sample time Ts = 10s.
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Units Value Description
ρr ρm ρb [kg/m
3] 0.15 Density of the liquid
αA 3.5 Volatility of xA
αB 1.1 Volatility of xB
αC 0.5 Volatility of xC
k∗1 [s
−1] 0.02
k∗2 [s
−1] 0.018
Ar [m
2] 0.3 Cross section area of the CSTR-1
Am [m
2] 3 Cross section area of the CSTR-2
Ab [m
2] 5 Cross section area of the flash separator
T0 [K] 313 Temperature of the manipulated flows
Td [K] 313 Temperature of the recycle flow
Cp [kJ/(kgK)] 25 Heat capacity of the liquid
xA0 1 Initial concentration of xA at CSTR-1
xB0 xC0 0 Initial concentration of xb, xc at CSTR-1
xA1 1 Initial concentration of xA at CSTR-2
xB1 xC1 0 Initial concentration of xb, xc at CSTR-2
∆H1 [kJ/kg] -40 Heat of reaction A −→ B
∆H2 [kJ/kg] -50 Heat of reaction B −→ C
E1/R E2/R [K] 150
kr [kg/s
−1m−1/2] 2.5
km [kg/s
−1m−1/2] 2.5
kb [kg/s
−1m−1/2] 1.5
Table 5-2.: Values of the parameters used in the simulations of the two CSTRs chain followed
by a nonadiabatic flash system
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Parameter Units Value Description
Hro [m] 180 Level of the CSTR-1 at the equilibrium point
Hmo [m] 190 Level of the CSTR-2 at the equilibrium point
Hbo [m] 5.2185 Level of the flash separator at the equilibrium point
F0o [kg/s] 2.667 Feeding flow of the CSTR-1 at the equilibrium point
F1o [kg/s] 1.067 Feeding flow of the CSTR-2 at the equilibrium point
Do [kg/s] 30.74 Recycle flow of the at the equilibrium point
Qro [kJ/s] 0 Cooling duty of the CSTR-1 at the equilibrium point
Qmo [kJ/s] 0 Cooling duty of the CSTR-2 at the equilibrium point
Qbo [kJ/s] 0 Cooling duty of the flash separator at the equilibrium point
Table 5-3.: Equilibrium point used to linearize the two CSTRs chain followed by a nonadia-
batic flash model
5.4.2. The Bargaining Game
From (5-13)-(5-15), the model of the process can be written as
x˙(t) = fc(x(t), u(t))
y(t) = gc(x(t), u(t))
(5-16)
where y(t) = [Hr, Tr, Hm, Tm, Hb, Tb]
T is the vector of outputs, u = [F0, F1, Qr, Qm, Qb, D] is
the vector of control inputs, x(t) = [Hr, x(Ar), x(Br), Tr, Hm, x(Am), x(Bm), Tm, Hb, x(Ab), x(Bb), Tb]
T
is the vector of states, and fc(·), gc(·) are functions relating the states and inputs with the
evolution of the states and the evolution of the outputs respectively.
With the objective of applying the proposed DMPC scheme, each reactor and the flash
separator were considered as subsystems. Note that by (5-13)-(5-15) the time evolution
of the dynamics of each subsystem are coupled by both the states and the inputs. Then,
linearizing and discretizing (5-13)-(5-15) with a sampling time Ts = 10 s, the model for each
subsystem is given by
xi(k + 1) =
3∑
j=1
Aijxj(k) +Bijuj(k)
yi(k) = Ciixi(k)
(5-17)
where i = 1, 2, 3, and with Aij , Bij , Cii submatrices of A, B, C respectively (A, B, C
come from the linearization of (5-13)-(5-15) at equilibrium point presented in Table 5-3).
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Similar to the case of the tanks a local quadratic cost function
Li(x˜i(k), u˜i(k)) =
Np−1∑
t=0
[
xTi (k + t|k)Qixi(k + t|k)
]
+
Nu∑
t=0
[
uTi (k + t)Riui(k + t)
]
+ xTi (k +Np|k)Pixi(k +Np|k)
(5-18)
i = 1, 2, 3 is used to measure the performance of each subsystem. Then following the
procedure presented in Chapter 2 with the local models given by linearization and by the
discretization of (5-13)-(5-15), the local cost functions can be written as (5-12), again with
Quui ≥ 0 a positive semidefinite matrix.
Note that in this case, the value of each local cost function also depends on the decisions
of the remaining two subsystems. Thus, the DMPC controller for the chain of two CSTRs
followed by a flash separator presented in Figure 5-4 has the following features:
• All subsystems have the same goal: to compute the optimal control inputs such that
the levels and the temperatures of the CSTRs and the flash separator are regulated
at their desired values.
• All subsystems are able to communicate each other in order to decide jointly the
course of action of each subsystem.
• In general, given (5-13)-(5-15) it follows that Adi 6= Adj and Bdi 6= Bdj , for i, j ∈
{1, 2, 3}. As a consequence Quui 6= Quuj, Qxui 6= Qxuj, for i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Hence, the DMPC controller for the chain of two CSTRs followed by a flash separator can
be represented as a game Gchain := {N, {φi(u˜(k)}i∈N , {Ωi}i∈N}, with N = {1, 2, 3}. Due
to the features of the game Gchain listed before, such game satisfies the conditions of a
non-symmetric bargaining game.
Below, the simulation results are presented.
5.4.3. Simulation Results and Discussion
Figures 5-5 to 5-7 show the performance of the closed-loop system where the control actions
were computed as a solution of the Gchain game. These Figures show how the levels and the
temperatures of the CSTRs and the flash separator were regulated to their desired values
despite of the changes on the set points in the levels. Then, in this case the control objective
was also satisfied. Moreover, as response to the set point changes in the levels, the local MPCs
of CSTR-1 and CSTR-2 jointly decreased and increased their feed flow rates (respectively)
in order to softly drive the system to the new desired operating point, while the local MPC
of flash separator increased the recycle flow in order to regulate its level and the level of
CSTR-1. This indicated a cooperative behavior among the MPC controllers.
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Figure 5-5.: Evolution of the level and the temperature of CSTR-1, their reference values,
and the control inputs. The trajectory of the level and the temperature of
the CSTR-1 exhibit an steady state error of 5% and 0.1% respectively. Such
difference is given by the high impact of the temperature in the behavior of the
process in the CSTR.
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Figure 5-6.: Evolution of the level and the temperature of CSTR-2, their reference values,
and the control inputs. The trajectory of the level and the temperature of
the CSTR-2 exhibit an steady state error of 4% and 0.1% respectively. Such
difference is given by the high impact of the temperature in the behavior of the
process in the CSTR.
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Figure 5-7.: Evolution of the level and the temperature of the nonadiabatic flash, their
reference values, and the control inputs. The trajectory of the level and the
temperature of the flash separator exhibit an steady state error of 20% and
0.1% respectively.
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However,
• Note that the decisions taken by each controller differed to each other. Thus, the
value of the cost function must be different for each subsystem.
• Since the feasible set of each subsystem is different with each other, the cost function
φ˜(u˜(k)) arising from the permutation of the elements of the cost function φ(u˜(k))
had elements that did not belong to the feasible set Υ, determined by the constraints
of the system shown in Figure 5-4.
Therefore, the game Gchain game did not satisfy the symmetry conditions stated for
discrete-time dynamic bargaining games in Chapter 4. But, despite of the non-symmetry
condition of the Gchain game, the control action remained constant once the steady state
was achieved. This validates the uniqueness condition of the solution of the non-symmetric
games.
5.5. Summary
In this Chapter two examples were presented in order to illustrate the theoretical concepts
about game theory introduced in Chapter 4. The first example used was the four tank system.
With this system the symmetry conditions of a DMPC game were validated. The second
example used was a system composed by a chain of two CSTRs followed by a flash separator.
This system was used to present a practical case where the non-symmetry conditions of
a DMPC game arise. In both examples, the control objective was a reference tracking
objective. As it was expected, the control objective was satisfied in both examples and the
cooperative behavior of the subsystems was also presented. Since the examples presented in
the current Chapter does not correspond to large-scale system, in Chapter 6 the proposed
control scheme is applied to a hydro-power valley, which is a real large-scale system.
6. Case of Study: A Hydro-Power Valley
6.1. Introduction
In this Chapter, the proposed DMPC control scheme is applied to the control of an HPV
system. With this purpose, two scenarios are considered: a power tracking scenario where a
total power demand is provided and the subsystems should compute the local control actions
in order to provide the demanded power, and an economic scenario where the electricity
prices as well as the prices of the stored water in the HPV are provided and the subsystems
should compute the local control actions to maximize the profit perceived by the operation
of the HPV. Section 6.2 presents a general description of an HPV, and introduces the case of
study and the model used as a testbed. In Section 6.3 the power tracking and the economic
scenario are described. With this objective: the mathematical formulation of the scenario
is introduced, the bargaining formulation of each scenario is presented, and the simulation
results are discussed. Finally, Section 6.4 expose a summary of the chapter.
6.2. A Hydro-Power Valley
6.2.1. System Description
A hydro-power valley (HPV) is a large-scale system whose main objective is to produce a
given amount of electric power by transforming the hydraulic energy of the water stored in
lakes and reaches. In this kind of systems the water flows across a duct equipped with a
turbine, this movement converts the potential energy of the water into mechanical energy,
which at the end of the process is converted into electric energy. As a constraint, the electric
power has to be produced considering that the water is also used for ancillary services like
navigation and irrigation, and also taking into account that the levels cannot be higher than
a predefined threshold in order to avoid floods (Faille, 2009). Figure 6-1 shows two elements
composing a typical HPV: a dam (which is used for storing water flowing in a river) and a
lock (which is used to let the barges pass the dams).
In general, an HPV is composed by dams, lakes, turbines, reaches, pumps, ducts, and in
some cases turbine-pumps elements as it is shown in Figure 6-2. The water is stored in
tanks, lakes and reaches formed by the inclusion of a dam into the course of a river. The
stored water flows across ducts from one reservoir to another, or from the reservoir to the
power houses where the potential energy of the water is converted into mechanical energy.
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Figure 6-1.: Typical elements composing an HPV: dams (left) and locks (right). These
elements are used for storing water and navigation facilities respectively (Faille,
2009)
In the first case, the ducts can be equipped with turbines to produce energy while water is
transmitted from one reservoir to another. In the second case, at the end of the ducts the
flow of water is regulated by adjusting their outflow. In both cases, the mechanical power
produced by the water is converted in electrical power by a generator connected to the grid.
Sometimes, the ducts are equipped with turbine-pump elements that allow to produce energy
while it is operating as a turbine, and to regulate the levels of the connected reservoirs while
it is operating as a pump (in the pump mode, some amount of the produced energy has to
be spent).
6.2.2. System Modelling
Consider the HPV shown in Figure 6-3. This HPV is composed by three lakes (Lm, m =
1, 2, 3), a duct (U1), a river with six dams (Dj, j = 1, . . . , 6), two turbines (Tp, p = 1, 2),
and two turbine-pump devices (Cp). The river has a constant inflow qin and a constant
tributary flow qtributary. Moreover, each dam Dj is equipped with a turbine for electric power
generation. They are located in the river and divided it into six reaches (Rj), where reaches
R1, R2 and R4, R5 are connected with lakes L1, L3 through turbines T1, T2 and turbine-
pumps C1, C2 respectively. Also, lakes L1, L2 are connected to each other by the duct U1.
This duct is used only to transport the water from one lake to another depending on the
difference of the levels.
A model suitable for control purposes using the HPV of Figure 6-3 is derived in (Savorgnan
and Moritz, 2011). This model is based on the following assumptions:
• The ducts are connected at the bottom of the lakes (or at the bottom of the river bed).
• The cross sections of the reaches and of the lakes are rectangular.
• The width of the reaches varies linearly along them.
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Figure 6-2.: Schematic diagram of an HPV. Here the interaction among the different ele-
ments composing an HPV is illustrated (Faille, 2009)
• The river bed slope is constant along every reach.
Based on these assumptions, the nonlinear, first-order Saint-Venant partial differential equa-
tions represent the state of the art for modeling one-dimensional river hydraulics with con-
stant fluid density (C. Setz et al., 2008). In these equations the hydraulic state of the river are
described by two variables: the water depth h(t, z) and the discharge q(t, z), both varying as
a function of space z and time t. Thus, the dynamics of each reach are given by (Savorgnan
and Moritz, 2011; C. Setz et al., 2008; Petrone, 2010; Gabriela Glanzmann et al., 2003)
∂q
∂z
+ ∂s
∂t
= 0
1
g
∂
∂t
(
q
s
)
+ 1
2g
∂
∂z
(
q
s
)2
+ ∂h
∂z
+ If − Io = 0 (6-1)
In (6-1), q = q(t, z), s = s(t, z), h = h(t, z), If = If(t, z), Io = Io(t, z), where s(t, z)
is the wetted surface, If(t, z) is the friction slope, Io(t, z) is the river bed slope, and g is
the gravitational acceleration. Since the cross sections of the reaches and lakes are assumed
rectangular, the wetted surface and the friction slope are given by (6-2) and (6-3) respectively
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Figure 6-3.: Hydro-Power Valley used as a case of study.
(Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011).
s(t, z) = w(z)h(t, z) (6-2)
If(t, z) =
q2(t, z)(w(z) + 2h(t, z))
4
3
k2str(w(z)h(t, z))
10
3
(6-3)
where w(z) is the river width, and kstr is the Gauckler-Manning-Strickler coefficient. For
modelling the lakes, duct, turbines, and turbine-pumps elements, (6-4)-(6-7) were used (Sa-
vorgnan and Moritz, 2011).
∂h(t)
∂t
=
qin(t)− qout(t)
S
(6-4)
qU1(t) = SU1sign(H(t))
√
2g|H(t)| (6-5)
pt(t) = ktqt(t)∆ht(t) (6-6)
pC(t) = kC(qC(t))qC(t)∆hC(t) (6-7)
where sign(·) is the sign function, S is the surface area of the lake, SU1 is the section of
the duct, kt is the turbine coefficient, qin(t), qout(t), are the input and output flows of the
lakes respectively, qt(t) is the turbine discharge, ∆ht(t), ∆hC(t) are the heads of the turbine
and the turbine-pump respectively, qU1 is the flow across the duct U1, pt(t), pC(t) are the
power generated by the turbines and the power generated or consumed by the turbine-pump
elements respectively,
kC(qC(t)) =
{
ktC if qC(t) ≥ 0
kpC if qC(t) < 0
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is the turbine-pump coefficient, ktC , kpC are the gains of the turbine-pump devices in turbine
or pump mode respectively, qC is the flow in the turbine-pump elements, and H(t) = hL2(t)−
hL1(t) + hU1, with hL1(t), hL2(t) the levels of the lakes 1 and 2 respectively, and hU1 the
height difference of the duct.
Although (6-1)-(6-7) describe the dynamic behavior of the HPV. This model is unsuitable
for control purposes. In order to obtain a suitable model a spatial discretization of (6-1) is
required. The expressions of the resulting model are given in (Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011).
Let hLm(t) denote the level of them-th lake. Let qTp, qCp denote the inflow of the p-th turbine
and p-th turbine-pump device respectively. For the reach Rj , let QRj = [q1j(t), . . . , qNxj(t)]
and hRj = [h1j(t), . . . , h(Nx+1)j(t)] denote the vector of outflows and the vector of levels at
each spatial partition, Nx being the number of spatial partitions of the reach. Also, let qRj
denote the outflow of the j-th turbine at the corresponding dam. Then, the inputs u(t) and
the states x(t) of the HPV can be defined as
u(t) = [qTTp(t), q
T
Cp(t), q
T
Rj(t)]
T ,
x(t) = [hTLm(t), Q
T
Rj(t), h
T
Rj(t)]
T
p = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, . . . , 6, m = 1, 2, 3. Based on this definition of states and inputs the
proposed DMPC scheme is formulated. Such a formulation is presented in next section.
6.3. Bargaining Control of a Hydro-Power Valley
As in almost all large-scale systems, the most common control scheme employed in practice
for controlling the HPV comprises a PI controller with disturbance feed-forward installed on
each individual power plant (C. Setz et al., 2008). However, the use of local PI controllers
does not guarantee an efficient use of the stored water, and in presence of disturbances
the performance of the entire system could be compromised. For tackling these issues,
multivariable control structures have been proposed for controlling HPV systems. Often,
these are optimal control schemes (see (Xiaohong et al., 1999) and the references therein).
In this way, centralized MPC schemes for controlling HPV have been proposed in (Gabriela
Glanzmann et al., 2003; C. Setz et al., 2008; Petrone, 2010). Since an HPV is a large scale
system, a centralized MPC is inflexible and unsuitable. Then distributed and/or hierarchical
MPC controllers are required. In the following sections, the bargaining approach to the
DMPC problem developed in Chapter 4 is applied to the HPV described in Section 6.2,
considering two scenarios: a power tracking scenario and an economic scenario.
6.3.1. The Power Tracking Scenario
The Scenario
In this scenario, the power output of the system should follow a given reference while keeping
the water levels in the lakes and at the dams as constant as possible. Such power reference
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is determined by the expected daily demand in the zone fed by the HPV. So, the global cost
function considered for the DMPC is composed by two terms (Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011):
• The first term penalizes the 1-norm of the power tracking error.
• The second term penalizes the 2-norm of the deviations of the levels in the lakes and
in the dams from their steady state values.
Thus, the centralized MPC problem is formulated as follows (Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011)
min
u(t)
∫ T
0
λ|pr(t)− p(x(t), u(t))|dt+
∫ T
0
(h(t)− hss)TQ(h(t)− hss)dt
Subject to:
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t))
u(t) ∈ C
(6-8)
where T is the prediction horizon, λ > 0, Q > 0 are diagonal matrices, pr(t), p(x(t), u(t)) are
the power reference and the power produced by the HPV respectively, hss is the vector of the
steady state levels, f(·) is a function representing the HPV dynamics, and C is the feasible
set composed by the constraints on u(t) and x(t). The power reference to be followed by the
entire system is known 24 hours in advance and the inputs of the system can be changed
every 30 minutes.
Linearizing and discretizing (6-1)-(6-7) the HPV model can be expressed as
x(k + 1) = Adx(k) +Bdu(k)
y(k) = Cdx(k) +Ddu(k)
(6-9)
where Ad, Bd, Cd, Dd are the matrices resulting of the linearization of (6-1)-(6-7), and y(k) =
[p(k), hTD(k)]
T , with hD(k) = [hD1Nx , hD2Nx, hD3Nx , hD4Nx, hD5Nx, hD6Nx ] the levels at the
dams (only the levels in the last element of the spatial discretization of the reaches are
considered to regulate the levels of the reaches). Note that the power produced by the
HPV is piecewise defined with respect to u(k) due to the turbine-pump elements. In or-
der to overcome this issue in the linearization, constants kdes1, kdes2 were introduced, virtual
inputs u¯1(k) ∈ [−qC1pump, qC1turb], u¯2(k) ∈ [−qC2pump, qC2turb] were considered, and a gain
compensation
up(k) =
{
kdesp
ktCp
u¯p(k) if u¯p(k) ≥ 0
kdesp
kpCp
u¯p(k) if u¯p(k) < 0
was proposed, where qC1pump, qC2pump, qC1turb, qC2turb are the maximum pumped flows and
maximum turbine flows for the turbine-pump elements C1, C2 respectively, p = 1, 2 (the
values of qC1pump, qC2pump, qC1turb, qC2turb are given in (Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011)).
Moreover, note that the dimension of the matrices Ad, Bd depends on Nx which in general
is large in order to adequately represent the HPV dynamics. Then a centralized MPC may
not be suitable and a DMPC is required.
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The Bargaining Game
Let Np be the prediction horizon. Then, the optimization problem (6-8) can be re-written
as
min
u˜(k)
λ|p˜r(k)− y˜p(u˜(k))|+ u˜T (k)Quuu˜(k) + hTD(k)Quxu˜(k) + hTD(k)QxxhTD(k)
Subject to:
u˜(k) ∈ Ω
u(k + ν) = u(k +Nu), ∀Nu < ν < Np − 1
(6-10)
where p˜r(k) = [pr(k), . . . , pr(k +Np)], y˜p(u˜(k)) = [p(x(k), u(k)), . . . , p(x(k), u(k +Np − 1))],
Quu = B¯
T
d Q¯B¯d, Qux = x
T (k)A¯Td Q¯B¯d, Qxx = A¯
T
d Q¯A¯d, and Ω is the feasible set composed by
the input constraints and the mapping of the state constraints to input constraints using
(6-9), with A¯d, B¯d the resulting matrices from the prediction of hD(k) along Np, and Q¯
the Q block diagonal matrix resulting from the transformation of (6-8) into (6-10). From
(Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011), it is possible to divide the HPV of Figure 6-3 into eight
subsystems:
• Subsystem 1: lakes L1 and L2, turbine T1, and turbine-pump C1.
• Subsystem 2: lake L3, turbine T2, and turbine-pump C2.
• Subsystems 3-8: reaches R1 to R6 respectively.
Based on this system decomposition, and from (6-9) the liearized model of each subsystem
is given by
xi(k + 1) =
8∑
j=1
Aijxj(k) +Bijuj(k)
yi(k) = Ciixi(k) +Diiui(k)
(6-11)
with Aij , Bij , Cii, Dii submatrices of A, B, C, D respectively. Let σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) be the
local cost function of each subsystem, σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) defined as
σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) = γ|p˜r(k)− y˜p(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))|
+ [u˜Ti (k), u˜
T
−i(k)]H¯i[u˜
T
i (k), u˜
T
−i(k)]
T + 2F¯i[u˜
T
i (k), u˜
T
−i(k)]
T
where H¯i, F¯i are the resultant matrices of the permutation of the rows and columns of Quu
and Qux respectively (the state dependence of σi(·) was omitted for notational convenience),
and γ ∈ R a constant weight (the term hTD(k)QxxhTD(k) was omitted because it is constant
with respect to the decision variables, then it does not affect the result of the optimization).
From (Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011), the state and input constraints are time independent
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and they only establishes lower and upper boundaries to the states and inputs. So, they are
independent for each subsystems, i.e., there is not coupled constraints.
Then, for the distributed control of the HPV:
• There exists a set of subsystems N = {1, . . . , 8}.
• For each subsystem, there exists a decision space Ωi determined by the state and
input constraints.
• For each subsystem, there exists a performance index σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) indicating the
preferences of each subsystem.
Hence, the DMPC for the HPV arising from the optimization problem (6-10) can be viewed
as a strategic game GHPV = {N, {σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))}i∈N , {Ωi}i∈N}.
Moreover,
Since all subsystems have the same goal: to minimize the power tracking error keeping
the levels in the lakes and at the dams as close as possible to their steady state values,
the game GHPV can be analyzed and solved as a discrete-time dynamic bargaining game
{(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0, with η(k) defined as in Chapter 3. In addition, due to the diversity of the
physical phenomena involved in an HPV, it is expected that the game GHPV belongs to
the class of non-symmetric bargaining games.
Then, according to (4-10) the distributed solution of the game GHPV is given by the solution
of the local optimization problems (6-12) (I. Alvarado et al., 2010; F. Valencia et al., 2010).
max
u˜i(k)
8∑
r=1
wr log(ηr(k)− σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)))
Subject to:
ηr(k) > σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))
u˜i(k) ∈ Ωi
(6-12)
Since the power produced by the HPV at time step k is equal to the sum of the powers
generated by all subsystems, and assuming that each one communicates the value of its
states and inputs to the remaining subsystems, it is possible to compute locally the power
produced by the others. Hence, the term γ|p˜r(k)− y˜p(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))| is reduced to compute
the power contribution of subsystem i given the power produced by the remaining subsys-
tems. Therefore, a reference value for each subsystem is not required. This also reduces the
computational and communication burden of the proposed DMPC scheme.
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Figure 6-4.: Comparison between the power produced by the HPV with the power reference,
when the proposed game-theory-based DMPC is used for computing the inputs
of the subsystems
Simulation Results
Based on the formulation presented in Section 6.3.1, a closed-loop simulation of the HPV
described in Section 6.2 was performed along 24 hours (simulation time). In this simulation,
kdes1 =
3
4
(ktC1 + kpC1), kdes2 =
3
4
(ktC2 + kpC2), Ts = 1800s (30 minutes), Np = 48 (corres-
ponding to a day), Nu = 32, w1,2 =
0.4
2
, w3−8 =
0.6
6
(the weights of subsystems 1 to 8),
ηi(0) = 1×105 (the initial disagreement point of subsystems 1 to 8), γ = 50, Q = I (I being
the identity matrix). The values of the parameters of (6-1)-(6-7), as well as the lower and
upper values of the inputs and the states were taken as proposed in (Savorgnan and Moritz,
2011).
Figure 6-4 shows the comparison between the power produced by the HPV and the power
reference when the proposed DMPC scheme computes the inputs of each subsystem. This
figure shows how the power produced by the HPV followed the power reference, satisfying
one of the objectives proposed for the control scheme. However, there was an oscillation
at the beginning of the experiment due to the transient generated by the change of power
from 175 MW (equilibrium power) to the initial required power 150 MW. Recall that in the
proposed control scheme there is no a power reference for each subsystem. Hence, the initial
change require a negotiation among subsystems in order to decide the amount of power
delivered by each power plant to supply the demanded power.
In order to maintain some power demand, the levels of the reaches and the lakes should be
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Figure 6-5.: Behavior of the levels in the lakes (first panel) and the levels at the dams (second
panel) of the HPV. In both panels the levels are inside the values defined by the
constraints, although the levels of the lakes (first panel) present large excursions
before remaining constant, while the levels of the reaches remains as constant
as possible.
modified. Figure 6-5 presents the behavior of the levels of the lakes and reaches. At the
beginning of the simulation the lakes increased their levels due to the reduction of power
from the equilibrium point to the set point (see first panel of Figure 6-5). When the required
power was increased the lakes reached constant levels of water, achieving one of the system
objectives. During the whole simulation the reaches maintained their levels as constant
as possible (see second panel of Figure 6-5). If it is considered that the reaches also can
be used for water traffic, maintaining constant their levels guarantees it. This condition
was considered in the selection of the weights, by giving more importance to the reaches
compared with the lakes; it is evidenced with the comparison:
∑8
i=3wi >
∑2
i=1wi.
The excursions of the levels of the lakes can be associated with the behavior of the control
inputs (see Figure 6-6). Even though the control inputs remained inside the range defined
by the constraints, the control actions of subsystems 1 and 2 had higher variations than
the control actions of the remaining subsystems with respect to their local capability. This
produced larger changes in the levels of the lakes than in the levels of the reaches. Recall
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Figure 6-6.: Control actions applied to the subsystems. In the first panel the behavior of
the control actions applied to subsystems 1 and 2 is presented. In the second
panel the behavior of the control actions applied to subsystems 3 to 8 is presen-
ted. In both panels the control actions remain inside the range defined by the
constraints of the control inputs.
that subsystems 3 to 8 were power plants and subsystems 1 and 2 were ducts equipped with
turbines and turbine-pump elements with less capability to produce electric power than the
power plants.
Finally, in Figure 6-7 the evolution of the disagreement points is presented. In this Figure,
the disagreement started at the same point but as they were evolving each subsystem had
its own value indicating the non-symmetry of the game GHPV. Figure 6-7 also shows a
zoom between 4× 104s and 7.5× 104s, note that all the disagreement points decreased with
low frequency oscillations. Such oscillations were associated to the decision process of each
subsystem.
6.3.2. The Economic Scenario
The Scenario
The economic scenario concerns the operation of the HPV based on the price of the electricity.
Here, the objective is to maximize the profit of the valley or to minimize the costs associated
90 6 Case of Study: A Hydro-Power Valley
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
x 104
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x 106
Time [s]
η(
t)
 
 
η1(t)
η2(t)
η3(t)
η4(t)
η5(t)
η6(t)
η7(t)
η8(t)
 
 
Figure 6-7.: Behavior of the disagreement points at the full simulation. This Figure shows
an overall evolution and presents a detailed view that allows to evidence the
non-symmetry of the game.
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with its operation. In this work, the focus of the economic scenario is to compute the optimal
control actions such that the profit of the HPV is maximized. Following the economic
scenario proposed by Savorgnan and Moritz (2011), the profit maximization relates two
important issues:
• The amount of money perceived by the production of electricity in the HPV.
• The opportunity cost determined by the water remaining in the system at the end of
the prediction horizon.
Thus, the centralized optimization problem associated with the economic scenario is formu-
lated as follows (Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011):
max
ui(t),xi(t)
l=23∑
l=0
cl
∫ tl+1
tl
8∑
i=1
pi(ui(t), xi(t))dt+
8∑
i=1
cTf,ihDi(Np)
Subject to: x˙i(t) = fi(x(t), u(t))
xi(t) ∈ Xi, i = 1, . . . , 8
ui(t) ∈ Ui, i = 1, . . . , 8
(6-13)
where tl = 3600l, cl is the electricity price during the l-th hour, cf,i is a vector pricing the
water remaining in the system at the end of the control horizon Np, pi(ui(t), xi(t)) is the
power produced by the subsystem i given ui(t), xi(t), hDi(Np) is the remaining water at
subsystem i at the end of the prediction horizon (for the reaches such amount of water was
assumed as the level at the dams), and Xi, Ui the feasible sets for the states and inputs of
subsystem i respectively (see (Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011) for details). In order to solve
this problem it is assumed that
• The prices of the electricity are known 24 hours in advance and change every hour.
• The prices of the electricity have the same behavior during the next day.
• The prices of the water remaining in the system are constant.
Moreover, in order to reduce the complexity of (6-13) a linearized model of the HPV is used
to predict the behavior of the power and the amount of water at the end of the prediction
horizon. From Section 6.2 the model of the turbine-pump devices is piecewice defined.
Hence, with the purpose of to obtain a linearized model of the HPV constants kdes1, kdes2
were introduced, virtual inputs u¯1(k) ∈ [−qC1pump, qC1turb], u¯2(k) ∈ [−qC2pump, qC2turb] were
considered, and a gain compensation
up(k) =
{
kdesp
ktCp
u¯p(k) if u¯p(k) ≥ 0
kdesp
kpCp
u¯p(k) if u¯p(k) < 0
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was proposed, with qC1pump, qC2pump, qC1turb, qC2turb are the maximum pumped flows and
maximum turbine flows for the turbine-pump elements C1, C2 respectively, p = 1, 2 (the
values of qC1pump, qC2pump, qC1turb, qC2turb are given in (Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011)) (similar
considerations were made in the power tracking scenario in order to obtain a linearized model
of the HPV). With this redefinition of the control inputs of the turbine-pump elements, the
discrete-time linear model of the HPV is given by
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k)
y(k) = Cx(k) +Du(k)
(6-14)
where Ad, Bd, Cd, Dd are the matrices resulting of the linearization of (6-1)-(6-7), and y(k) =
[p(k), hTLD(k)]
T , with hLD(k) = [hL1(k), hL2(k), hL3(k), hD1Nx(k), hD2Nx(k), . . . , hD6Nx(k)] the
levels at the lakes and the dams (only the levels in the last element of the spatial discretization
of the reaches are considered to regulate the levels of the reaches).
The Bargaining Game
As in the power tracking scenario, let Np be the prediction horizon. Then, optimization
problem (6-13) can be written as
max
u˜
c˜Tl
8∑
i=1
y˜i(k) +
8∑
i=1
cf,iy˜hi(k +Np)
Subject to: u˜i(k) ∈ Ωi, i = 1, . . . , 8
(6-15)
where y˜i(k) denotes the power produced by subsystem i along the prediction horizon Np,
i.e., y˜i(k) = [yi(k), . . . , yi(k+Np)]
T , y˜hi(k) denotes the level of the lakes and the dams along
the prediction horizon Np , i.e., y˜hi(k) = [y
T
hi(k), . . . , y
T
hi(k + Np)]
T , c˜l is the projection of
the electricity prices along the prediction horizon Np, and Ωi is the feasible set of control
actions determined by U and the formulation of X as input constraints (this can be done
using the linearized model (6-13)). Recall that y(k) = [p(k), hTLD(k)]
T , with hLD(k) =
[hL1(k), hL2(k), hL3(k), hD1Nx(k), hD2Nx(k), . . . , hD6Nx(k)]. Then, in (6-15) cf,i is the value of
the water in the lakes and at the dams, i.e., cf,i is a scalar not a vector as in (6-13).
As it was stated in Section 6.3.1, it is possible to divide the HPV of Figure 6-3 into eight
subsystems:
• Subsystem 1: lakes L1 and L2, turbine T1, and turbine-pump C1.
• Subsystem 2: lake L3, turbine T2, and turbine-pump C2.
• Subsystems 3-8: reaches R1 to R6 respectively.
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Based on this system decomposition and in (6-14), the liearized model of each subsystem is
given by
xi(k + 1) =
8∑
j=1
Aijxj(k) +Bijuj(k)
yi(k) = Ciixi(k) +Diiui(k)
(6-16)
with Aij, Bij, Cii, Dii submatrices of A, B, C, D respectively. From (6-14) y˜i(k) is a
function of u˜(k). Then, y˜pi(k) and y˜hi(k) are also functions of u˜(k) (the dependence of y˜pi(k)
and y˜hi(k) on the states is not considered because y˜pi(k) and y˜hi(k) do not depend on the
projection of the trajectory of the states along the prediction horizon). Let σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))
be the local cost function of subsystem i, defined (with abuse of notation) as
σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) = c˜
T
l
8∑
i=1
y˜i(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) +
8∑
i=1
cf,iy˜hi(u˜i(k +Np), u˜−i(k +Np))
Then, for the economic operation of the HPV:
• There exists a set of subsystems N = {1, . . . , 8}.
• Each subsystem has a decision space Ωi determined by the input and state con-
straints.
• Each subsystem has a cost function σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) indicating its preferences.
Therefore, the economic operation of the HPV determined by the optimization problem
(6-13) can be analyzed as an strategic game Gec = {N, {Ωi}i∈N , {σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))}i∈N}.
Furthermore,
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Since
• The value of σi(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) depends of the value of the decisions of the other
subsystems
• It is assumed that all subsystems are able to communicate with each other in order
to decide what local control action should be applied.
• All subsystems have the same goal: to maximize the profit perceived by the produc-
tion of the electricity in the HPV
The game Gec can be analyzed and solved as a discrete-time dynamic bargaining game
{(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0, with η(k) defined as in Chapter 4. Moreover, (as in the power tracking
scenario) due to the diversity of the physical phenomena involved in the HPV, it is expected
that the game Gec belongs to the non-symmetric bargaining games.
Then, according to (4-10) the distributed solution of the game GHPV is given by the solution
of the local optimization problems (6-17) (I. Alvarado et al., 2010; F. Valencia et al., 2010).
max
u˜i(k)
8∑
r=1
wr log(σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))− ηr(k))
Subject to: u˜r(k) ∈ Ω
σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k)) > ηr(k)
(6-17)
i = 1, . . . , 8. Note that in (6-17) the argument of the logarithm function is not the same
that the argument of the logarithmic function in (4-10). Such change is motivated by the
objective of the control strategy: in (4-10) the objective is to minimize a cost function while
the objective in (6-17) is to maximize a profit function. Moreover, in (6-17) the disagreement
point should be redefined because in this case the disagreement point must be increased if the
subsystems decide to cooperate. Otherwise, it must be decreased. Such change is motivated
by the fact that in (6-17) the value of the disagreement point η(k) indicates the minimum
profit expected by each subsystem for the production of electricity in the HPV. So,
ηi(k + 1) =
{
ηi(k) + α(σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))− ηi(k)) if ηi(k) < σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))
ηi(k)− (ηi(k)− σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))) if ηi(k) ≥ σr(u˜i(k), u˜−i(k))
∀i ∈ N , with 0 < α < 1.
Simulation Results
As in tracking scenario, in order to test the performance of the proposed control scheme
in the economic scenario a closed-loop simulation of the HPV was carried out along 24
hours (simulation time). Moreover, the same values used in the power tracking scenario for
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Figure 6-8.: Economic operation of the HPV. The top panel shows the behavior of the prices
of the electricity along the simulation. The bottom panel shows the power
produced by the HPV. Despite of the changes in the prices of the electricity the
power produced by the HPV remains constant along the simulation.
the gain compensation, the sampling time, prediction horizon, the control horizon, and the
weights of the subsystems were considered, i.e., kdes1 =
3
4
(ktC1+kpC1), kdes2 =
3
4
(ktC2+kpC2),
Ts = 1800s (30 minutes), Np = 48 (corresponding to a day), Nu = 32, w1,2 =
0.4
2
, w3−8 =
0.6
6
(the weights of subsystems 1 to 8). However, in the economic scenario the disagreement point
of all subsystems was started in 0. The values of cl, cf,i, and the values of the parameters
of (6-1)-(6-7), as well as the lower and upper values of the inputs and the states were taken
from (Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011).
Figure 6-8 shows the behavior of the prices and the power produced by the HPV along the
simulation. In this Figure, despite of the changes of the prices of the electricity the power
produced by the HPV remained almost constant along the simulation. Such behavior was
determined by the prices of changing the levels of the reaches. If the use of the stored water
to produce energy provided a higher profit than keeping the water at the same levels and
producing the same amount of power, then the water levels was changed. Otherwise, the
levels at the lakes and reaches were kept at a constant value. Recall that the profit of each
subsystem is given by the difference between its disagreement ηi(k) point and its local profit
function σi(·).
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Figure 6-9.: Stored water in the HPV. The first panel presents the behavior of the levels of
the lakes. The second panel presents the behavior of the levels at the dams. In
this Figure, almost all levels tend to their maximum value. Such behavior obey
to the maximization of the stored water in the HPV.
From (Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011), the water of the lake 1 provides more profit than the
water in lakes 2 and 3, being the cheapest water the water stored in lake 2. Furthermore,
the water stored at the dam of the reach 3 provides more profit than the water stored at the
dams in the remaining reaches. Since the price of the water is higher (in all the cases) than
the price of the electricity the results shown in Figure 6-8 were the expected: a constant
production of electricity in order to maximize the water stored in the lakes and reaches.
Figure 6-9 presents the behavior of the levels of the water in the lakes and at the dams
along the simulation.
From Figure 6-9, since the water of lake 2 is cheaper than the water stored in lakes 1 and
3 all this water is used to produce energy. As a consequence, the level of lake 2 reached its
minimum value. Despite of the fact that the water stored in lake 1 is the water providing the
highest profit in the HPV (Savorgnan and Moritz, 2011), such level also reached its minimum
value because it depends on the level of lake 2. However, the loss of profit associated with
the changes in the level of lake 1 was compensated with the level of lake 3. Such level was
kept constant during the first half of the simulation and in the second half some variations
(around the value of the first half of the simulation) were exhibited.
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Figure 6-10.: Control actions applied to the HPV. First panel presents the control actions ap-
plied to economically use the stored water in the lakes. Second panel presents
the control actions applied to economically use the water stored in the reaches.
In this Figure are clearly evidenced the efforts made by the controllers to reg-
ulate the stored water in the lakes and in the reaches.
In addition, the loss of profit given by the changes in the levels of the lakes was also com-
pensated with the increasing of the levels of the reaches. Note that only the levels at the
dams 2 y 4 were decreased. These changes were carried out in order to regulate the levels of
the lakes 2 and 3 (in the reaches 2 and 4 there is the possibility to pump water to regulate
the level at the corresponding lake). Such regulation efforts were evidenced in the operation
of the different control elements of the HPV. Figure 6-10 shows the behavior of the control
actions applied to the HPV during the simulation.
In Figure 6-10 was clear that at the beginning of the simulation the water stored in lake 2
is used to produce energy as it was stated before. Such energy production was made using
the corresponding turbine-pump device while the turbine kept unused in order to regulate
(in a certain way) the level of the lakes 1 and 2. This was indicated by the positive sign of
qt1. Moreover, this action also allowed to regulate the level at the reaches. Furthermore, in
order to economically use the water stored in the lake 3 the corresponding turbine was with
a half of its capability, while the turbine-pump device was turned off. Such actions were used
during the first half of the simulation. In the second half, the turbine and the turbine-pump
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Figure 6-11.: Evolution of the disagreement points. Here, the cooperative behavior of the
subsystems remained during 6 × 104 s where the non-cooperative behavior
arises. This is reflected in the decreasing of the value of the disagreement
point of some subsystems.
devices connected to lake 3 were commuted in order to regulate the level of the lake and the
level of the reaches. All control actions presented in Figure 6-10 were determined according
to the decision process carried out to determine the local control actions that maximizes
the profit obtained by the operation of the HPV. Figure 6-11 presents the evolution of the
disagreement points (recall that the disagreement point in the economic scenario determines
the minimum expected profit by each subsystem for the production of electricity and for
storing water).
In Figure 6-11 the cooperation among subsystems was make evident. All disagreement
points start at the same value and their increases (with different rates, which means that
the game Gec is non-symmetric) until 610× 4 s where a non-cooperative behavior appears.
At this time, some subsystems did not perceived any benefit by the cooperation, i.e., there
were no feasible control such that the minimum expected profit is achieved. Hence, the
corresponding control actions were kept constant (see Figure 6-10). As a consequence, a
decreasing of the disagreement point of these subsystems was done in order to promote the
cooperation of these subsystems several time steps ahead (note that the cooperation starts
again at the next time step).
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6.4. Summary
In this Chapter the proposed DMPC scheme was used for controlling a HPV in a power
reference tracking scenario, and to operate the a HPV in a economic scenario. With this
purpose, a mathematical model suitable for control objectives was presented. Since the
mathematical model used has a discontinuity at the equilibrium point, a gain compensation
had to be used in order to derive a linearized model of the HPV. The resultant model was
used to predict the behavior of the HPV in both scenarios (power tracking and economic
scenarios). In such cases, the HPV achieves the control objectives (as it was expected). This
validates the relevance of the proposed DMPC scheme for controlling large-scale systems.
7. Concluding Remarks and Future
Research
Conclusions
In this thesis, the problem of the application of model predictive control to large-scale sys-
tems was dealt. With this purpose, the distributed model predictive control framework was
used. Thus, the thesis begins with a literature review about distributed model predictive
control approaches to the control of large-scale systems. From this literature review the
cooperation among subsystems arose as an open research topic, and game theory arose as a
mathematical framework to dealt with this open issue. So, the literature review was com-
pleted by reviewing the literature relating game theory with distributed model predictive
control. As a consequence of such review it was possible to conclude that the approaches
where game theory was used to deal with the problem of cooperation in distributed model
predictive control schemes were based on the concept of Nash equilibrium point, which may
produce an undesirable closed-loop performance of the entire system.
In order to tackle this drawback the formulation of the distributed model predictive control
as a bargaining game was proposed in this work.
Taking this aim in mind, the concept of game and its classification was introduced focusing
on bargaining games, their elements, classification, and properties. However,
Since the original bargaining game theory was developed for static decision environments
and the control theory involves dynamic decision context, an extension of the original
bargaining game theory was proposed in order to formulate the distributed model predictive
control problem as a bargaining game. Such extension consisted on defining the discrete-
time dynamic bargaining games based on the original bargaining theory.
Moreover,
Since there is not a method reported in the literature for computing the disagreement
point and this is a key element of the bargaining game theory, in this thesis a dynamic way
for computing the disagreement point satisfying the requirements stated in the original
bargaining game theory was proposed.
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Based on the concept of discrete-time dynamic bargaining games and considering the defin-
ition of the disagreement point, it was possible to define the distributed model predictive
game, to analyze the properties of the game such as
• Symmetry.
• Uniqueness of the solution.
• Convexity of the associated optimization problem.
and to develop an axiomatic characterization of the proposed solution of distributed model
predictive control games. As a consequence of the the axiomatic characterization of the
discrete-time dynamic bargaining games presented in this thesis,
A general framework to formulate hierarchical and/or distributed model predictive control
schemes based on the concept of weighted hierarchy was introduced.
Furthermore, a negotiation model to solve the distributed model predictive control game was
proposed. Properties like the closed-loop stability of the system when the control actions
are computed by the proposed control scheme were also discussed.
The concepts introduced in order to formulate the distributed model predictive control prob-
lem as a bargaining game and the properties associated with the distributed model predictive
game were illustrated by using the quadruple tank process, a chain of two reactors followed
by a flash separator, and a hydro-power valley as test beds.
In the simulations the performance of the proposed control scheme was tested, with the
expected results: all the systems achieved the control objective satisfying the properties
discussed in the theory.
Future Work
From the development of this thesis several research problems arise as open research prob-
lems. One of them is the definition of the disagreement point. Although in this thesis a
definition of the disagreement point was proposed based on the requirements established by
the original theory of the bargaining games, a more formal definition of the disagreement
point is required. Also, an improvement of the analysis of the effect of the disagreement point
in the performance of the proposed control scheme should be done. Clarifying these pending
issues it is possible to apply the proposed solution of bargaining games in other knowledge
fields. As it was stated by Peters (1992): The dynamic definition of the disagreement
point opens a research field on the solution of differential equations by using the
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bargaining game theory. This argument strengthen the idea proposed before about the
application of the proposed solution to different fields of knowledge.
Other pending issue is the development of more efficient algorithms or methods for solving
the optimization problem associated with the solution of the distributed model predictive
control game. Since the cost function used to solve the game is a logarithmic function its
argument cannot take values less than zero. However, depending of the operative system, the
routine used to solve the problem, and the precision of the machine the numerical solution
can derive in unexpected solutions such as NaN or infinite solutions. Maybe the use of
a quadratic approach of the logarithmic function or formulating the optimization problem
directly as the minimization of the norm of the gradient of the logarithmic function can help
to deal with this drawback.
Related with the definition of the weighted hierarchy two main issues have been identified:
• How to select the weights of the subsystems. In this thesis controllability and sensitivity
analysis have been proposed as analysis that can be used with this purpose. However,
this topic was not treated in depth. In all the cases presented in the thesis the weights
were selected based on the previous knowledge of the system and in some heuristics.
• In the application of the proposed control scheme to hierarchical control structures,
how to make a partition of the set of subsystems, and which is the best sequence of
solution of the resulting lexicographic optimization problem.
Finally, the proposed control scheme must be tested in other large-scale systems in order to
validate its applicability in real systems.
A. Local Cost Function in Distributed
Model Predictive Control Schemes
With the purpose of showing how to obtain the subobjective function
φi(u˜(k); x(k)) = u˜
T (k)Quuiu˜(k) + 2x
T (k)Qxuiu˜(k) + x
T (k)Qxxix(k) (A-1)
for i = 1, . . . ,M , the procedure presented in (Aswin N. Venkat et al., 2006, Appendix A) is
followed.
Consider the nonlinear system given by (A-2).
x˙(t) = fx(x(t), u(t))
y(t) = fy(x(t), u(t))
(A-2)
Assume that (A-2) can be decomposed into M subsystems such that the dynamics of each
subsystem are given by the discrete-time state equation (A-3).
xi(k + 1) =
M∑
j=1
[Aijxj(k) +Bijuj(k)] yi(k) = Ciixi(k) +Diiui(k) (A-3)
Also, assume (A-4) as the objective function of the centralized model predictive control for
(A-2).
L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) =
Np−1∑
t=0
[
xT (k + t|k)Qx(k + t|k)]+ Nu∑
t=0
[
uT (k + t)Ru(k + t)
]
+ xT (k +Np|k)Px(k +Np|k)
(A-4)
By propagating (A-3) through the prediction horizon, expression (A-5)is obtained for sub-
system i, i = 1, . . . ,M (Aswin N. Venkat et al., 2006).
x˜i(k) = Eiiu˜i(k) + Fiixi(x) +
∑
i 6=j
[Eij u˜j(k) +Gij x˜j + Fijxj(k)] (A-5)
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In (A-5) x˜i(k) = [x
T
i (k), . . . , x
T
i (k +Np)]
T , u˜i(k) = [u
T
i (k), . . . , u
T
i (k +Np − 1)]T , and
Eij =

Bij 0 . . . . . . 0
AiiBij Bij 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
A
Np−1
ii Bij A
Np−2
ii Bij . . . . . . Bij

Fij =

Aij
AiiAij
...
A
Np−1
ii Aij

Gij =

0 . . . . . . . . . 0
Aij 0 . . . . . . 0
...
...
. . .
. . .
...
A
Np−2
ii Aij A
Np−3
ii Aij . . . . . . 0

Let x¯(k) = [x˜T1 (k), . . . , x˜
T
M (k)]
T and u¯(k) = [u˜T1 (k), . . . , u˜
T
M(k)]
T . Then, combining the
expressions for x˜i(k) we have
Ax¯(k) = Bu¯(k) +Cx(k) (A-6)
where
A =

I −G12 . . . −G1M
−G21 I . . . −G2M
...
. . .
. . .
...
−GM1 . . . . . . I
 B =
 E11 . . . E1M... . . . ...
EM1 . . . EMM

C =
 F11 . . . F1M... . . . ...
FM1 . . . FMM

From (A-6), and by the fact that A always is invertible (Aswin N. Venkat et al., 2006)
x˜i(k) = Eiiu˜i(k) + Fiixi(x) +
∑
i 6=j
[Eij u˜j(k) + Fijxj(k)] (A-7)
Note that propagating (A-4) through the prediction horizon and organizing the terms ac-
cordingly, the objective function for the centralized MPC becomes
L(x˜(k), u˜(k)) = x¯T (k)Q¯x¯(k) + u¯T (k)R¯u¯(k) (A-8)
where Q¯ and R¯ are block diagonal matrices resulting from the organization of the terms
and from the propagation of (A-4) through the prediction horizon. Moreover, since Q,R are
diagonal matrices (A-8) can be expressed as the sum of local cost functions
Li(x˜i(k), u˜i(k)) = x˜
T
i (k)Q¯ix˜
T
i (k) + u˜
T
i (k)R¯iu˜i(k) (A-9)
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By substituting (A-7) into (A-9) the local objective function Li(x˜i(k), u˜i(k)) becomes in a
quadratic function φi(u˜(k); xk), where
φi(u˜(k); x(k)) = u˜
T (k)Quuiu˜(k) + 2x
T (k)Qxuiu˜(k) + x
TQxxix(k) (A-10)
From the procedure presented in this section it is possible to conclude that the decomposition
of the centralized objective function (A-4) into M local objectives defined as in (A-1) is
unique for each subsystem decomposition (A-3).
B. Properties of the Distributed Model
Predictive Control Game
B.1. Proof of Proposition 2
In order to prove Proposition 2, we have to demonstrate that the set
Ψ = {φi(u˜(k)) ∈ Υ: η(k) ≥ φ(u˜(k)), u˜(k) ∈ Ω, i ∈ N}
is convex, and that (4-3) is strictly quasiconcave on Ψ. This guarantees that ϕ(Υ, η(k)) is
unique at k, with k fixed.
Note that Ψ = Υ ∩ O, with O = {φi(u˜(k)) ∈ R : η(k) > φ(u˜(k))}. Since Υ and O are both
convex sets Ψ is also a convex set. Then, the first part of the proof is completed.
For the second part of the proof, recall that a function ϑ : Ξ −→ R, with Ξ a convex subset
of Rm for some m ∈ N, is strictly quasiconcave if ϑ(λα + (1− λ)α′) > min{ϑ(α), ϑ(α′)} for
any α 6= α′ ∈ Ξ, λ ∈ (0, 1).
Let u˜(k), u˜′(k) ∈ Ω such that u˜(k) 6= u˜′(k), φ(u˜(k)) ∈ Ψ, and φ(u˜′(k)) ∈ Ψ. Let ϑ(u˜(k)) :=
Πi∈N(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k))). Then
ϑ(λu˜(k) + (1− λ)u˜′(k)) = Πi∈N (ηi(k)− φi(λu˜(k) + (1− λ)u˜′(k)))
Since φi(u˜(k)) is a convex function of u˜(k)
φi(λu˜(k) + (1− λ)u˜′(k)) < λφi(u˜(k)) + (1− λ)φi(u˜′(k))
for λ ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, . . . ,M . Moreover,
max{φi(u˜(k)), φi(u˜′(k))} > λφi(u˜(k)) + (1− λ)φi(u˜′(k)) > min{φi(u˜(k)), φi(u˜′(k))}
Hence,
ϑ(λu˜(k) + (1− λ)u˜′(k)) > Πi∈N (ηi(k)−max{φi(u˜(k)), φi(u˜′(k))}),
which implies
ϑ(λu˜(k) + (1− λ)u˜′(k)) > min{ϑ(u˜(k)), ϑ(u˜′(k))}
Hence, the function ϑ(u˜(k)) is a strictly quasiconcave function of u˜(k) on Ψ. Therefore,
ϕ(Υ, η(k)) is unique at k.
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B.2. Proof of Proposition 3
From Proposition 2 ϕ(Υ, η(k)) is unique. Hence, does not exist u˜′(k) ∈ Ω satisfying
Πi∈N (ηi(k) − φi(u˜′(k))) > Πi∈N (ηi(k) − ϕi(Υ, η(k))) on Ψ. Furthermore, since ηi(k) −
φi(u˜(k)) > 0 on Ψ does not exist u˜
′(k) ∈ Ω satisfying φ(u˜′(k)) < ϕ(Υ, η(k)). So, ϕ(Υ, η(k)) ∈
W ′(Ψ) at k.
B.3. Proof of Proposition 4
By Proposition 2 ϕ(Υ, η(k)) is unique. Since Υ′ ⊂ Υ, η′(k) = η(k), and ϕ(Υ, η(k)) ∈ Υ′, the
solution of the DMPC game (Υ′, η′(k)) at k is ϕ(Υ, η(k)). Hence, ϕ(Υ, η(k)) = ϕ(Υ′, η′(k)).
B.4. Proof of Proposition 5
By definition aΥ + b : = {φ˜(u˜(k)) ∈ RM : φ˜(u˜(k)) = aφ(u˜(k)) + b, φ(u˜(k)) ∈ Υ}. From
Lemma 3, γ(k) is the bargaining solution of the DMPC game (Υ, η(k)) at k if and only if∑
i∈N
φi(u˜(k))
ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k)) =
∑
i∈N
γi(k)
ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k))
supports Υ at γ(k). For the game (aΥ+ b, aη(k) + b) we have
∑
i∈N
φ˜i(u˜(k))
aiηi(k) + bi − φ˜i(u˜(k))
=
∑
i∈N
φi(u˜(k))
ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k)) +
∑
i∈N
bi
ai(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k))) ,
which can be written equivalently as
∑
i∈N
φ˜i(u˜(k))
aiηi(k) + bi − φ˜i(u˜(k))
=
∑
i∈N
γi(k)
ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k)) +
∑
i∈N
bi
ai(ηi(k)− φi(u˜(k)) ,
and consequently
∑
i∈N
φ˜i(u˜(k))
aiηi(k) + bi − φ˜i(u˜(k))
=
∑
i∈N
aiγi(k) + bi
aiηi(k) + bi − φ˜i(u˜(k))
Then (by Lemma 3), the bargaining solution of the DMPC game (aΥ+ b, aη(k) + b) at k is
equal to aϕ(Υ, η(k)) + b, i.e., ϕ(aΥ + b, aη(k) + b) = aϕ(Υ, η(k)) + b.
B.5. Proof of Proposition 6
Following the procedure proposed in (Peters, 1992) for this demonstration we have: By the
symmetry of the DMPC game {(Υ, η(k))}∞k=0 we have η1(k) = . . . = ηM(k). Let ϕ˜(Υ, η(k))
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denote the solution of the game (Υ, η(k)) arising by the permutation of the elements of
ϕ(Υ, η(k)). By the definition of W ′(Υ), ϕ(Υ, η(k)) = ϕ˜(Υ, η(k)). Then, ϕ1(Υ, η(k)) =
ϕ2(Υ, η(k)) = . . . = ϕM(Υ, η(k)).
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